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High levels of unemployment, or high levels of social expenditures as well as the growing demand 
for a flexible labour force have given new impetus to the world-wide discussion on what model to 
use for an efficiently operating labour market and in particular on the role of institutions. Although 
there seems to be a growing consensus on the restricted governmental role in recent decades, this  
has not been translated into a unanimous appraisal of the role of intermediary organisations, such as 
trade unions. There is no clear view on an appropriate distribution of responsibility between 
government, social partners and the market. The research project ‘distribution of responsibility for 
social security’ aims to create a scientific basis for a clear and consistent view on the role and 
distribution of responsibilities between the different labour market institutions. As part of this 
research project, this paper provides an elaborate country study of Denmark. 
 
It is shown that legislation of unemployment insurance and active labour market policy is set by the 
national government. Legislation with respect to employment protection, however, is largely left to 
the social partners, i.e. the dismissal of salaried workers is regulated by a special piece of national 
law, while the rules for blue-collar workers are defined as part of the negotiations between the 
social partners. The Danish system of unemployment insurance and active labour market policy is a 
two-tier system: unemployment insurance for members of unemployment insurance funds and social 
assistance for non-members. The first tier is basically state-run system, while the second tier is 
administered by the municipalities. As for the performance of the Danish labour market, 
participation rates are quite high and although unemployment rates are relatively high and 
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 Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 A  QUICK VIEW ON EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND  
LABOUR MARKET POLICY  
 
1.1.1 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
 
In the recent exposure given to the Danish employment system (often labelled the Danish 
“flexicurity-model”), it is generally emphasised that the overall level of employment protection in 
Denmark is at a low level and comparable to liberal labour markets like that of the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, this low level of protection is a long-standing feature of the Danish labour market 
dating back to the General Agreement between the social partners that was the outcome of a 
general strike in 1899. The so-called September-agreement defined the right for the employers to 
manage the work-place (including the right to hire and dismiss workers), while the employers on the 
other hand recognised the trade unions as legitimate counterparts in negotiations about wages and 
work conditions. One of the characteristics of the Danish labour market, which is in contrast to for 
instance the situation in Sweden, is that this low level of employment protection has been intact 
until present times.   
 
Regulating individual employment protection and setting rules concerning dismissals is therefore left 
to the social partners. As a result of this, a closer look at the employment protection found on the 
Danish labour market will reveal that the level of protection against dismissals varies between 
different groups and between different sectors. By example, in the construction sector dismissal 
periods can be only one day, while other blue-collar workers have an employment protection 
similar to that of salaried workers (cf. below). The wide dispersion between the different groups of 
employees when it comes to employment protection legislation makes it difficult to use the OECD-
method of aggregating the different rules to a single number indicating the EPL-strictness for the 
labour market as a whole. Nevertheless, the overall assessment of employment protection in 
Denmark is however that the protection level is in the lower end of the spectrum, cf. Figure 1.1.1
 
As an important exception, the dismissal of salaried workers is regulated by a special piece of 
legislation, while the rules for blue-collar workers, as mentioned, are defined as part of the general 
negotiations between the social partners. But even for salaried workers the term of notice is rather 
short, depending however on the seniority of the employee. For a seniority of less than three years, 
the notice period is three months. The maximum notice period is 6 months after at least 9 years of 
                                                  
1 In Section 2.2 a closer look is taken at the employment protection for different groups.  
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employment. For some groups the employer also must present a concrete reason for the dismissal, 
either based on circumstances related to the employee or the firm.  
 




















































































































Source: OECD (2004b), chapter 2, Table 2.A2.1. 
 
An interesting trait is that there are no special regulations for public employees, who are in general 
subject to the same rules as in the private sector. The exemption is the minority of public 
employees, who still have a special status as public servants, although the tendency over the last 
decades has been to phase out this category of public employees. 
 
1.1.2 SOCIAL INSURANCE 
 
A characteristic feature of Danish social security and labour market policy is the development and 
stability of a two-tier system – one for the employed and unemployed – and one for those groups 
with no attachment to the labour market (Damgaard, 2003). Until the end of the 1800-years both 
systems had social security as their focus. The municipalities were in charge of a public system that 
took care of those in need, while the guilds supported sickness insurance for the craftsmen and 
provided work for the unemployed members. Over the last hundred years those two systems grew 
into the present day two-tier system.   
 
The Danish system of unemployment insurance is based on the so-called Ghent-system. It consists 
of 31 state recognised unemployment insurance funds. Ten of them operate within specific 
occupational fields, which means that only employed persons from specific occupational fields can 
become members. Thirteen of the unemployment insurance funds operate within specific 
occupational fields, but also admit self-employed persons working within the occupational field as 
members. Three of them are cross-occupational unemployment funds, which mean that they admit 
10   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
employed persons from all occupational fields as members. Four of them are unemployment funds 
for both employed persons and self-employed persons. One unemployment insurance fund only 
admits self-employed persons as members. When a person moves from one unemployment fund to 
another, either due to a shift in occupation or because s/he decides to do so, the right to 
unemployment benefits are transferred at the same time.  
 
Most of the unemployment insurance funds are affiliated with one or more trade unions. While 
membership of an unemployment insurance fund is independent of being a member of a trade union, 
most workers will conceive the membership of the trade union and the affiliated unemployment 
insurance fund as a package. This is probably due to the long historical bonds between the two 
institutions and to the fact that trade unions do little to advertise the formal difference between the 
two kinds of membership. Also, of course, membership of a trade union offers some advantages, 
which are unrelated to receiving unemployment benefits like support in wage negotiations and 
conflicts with the employer.  
 
The present version of the system for economic support for the unemployed dates back to the last 
large reform of the unemployment benefit system in 1969, where the state took over the 
responsibility for financing the extra costs of unemployment benefits that were caused by increases 
in unemployment (the principle of public financing “at the margin”). The members of the 
unemployment insurance funds will therefore only be obliged to pay a fixed membership 
contribution, independent of the actual level of unemployment. This mechanism for financing 
unemployment insurance implies that the share of public funding depends on the total number of 
unemployed. In periods of high unemployment as in the early 1990s, the Government’s share rises 
to 80 percent, while it falls to less than 50 percent during economic upswings.  
 
Apart from those having exhausted their right to unemployment benefits, the group of “non-
insured” unemployed consist of those unemployed, which do not fulfil the criteria for becoming 
eligible to unemployment benefits in the first place (cf. the list of criteria presented below). The 
group of unemployed must apply for cash-benefits administered by the local government (the 
municipalities). Cash benefits are means-tested and the amount depends on the family-situation of 
the unemployed. 
 
1.1.3 ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
Until the end of 2006, the basic Danish system of labour market policy is organised around three 
levels: the state level, the regional level and the municipalities. The regional level is made up by of 14 
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regions (counties), excluding the large municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg that have a 
special status within the regional level.  The local level is structured around 271 municipalities 
(including the municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg).  
 
In broad terms the division of labour between the regional level and the local level is that the 
regions are responsible for health care and secondary education, while most other public services 
(including primary schools, social services and care for the elderly) are delivered by the 
municipalities. As already noted, due to their right to collect their own taxes, regional and local 
government share a rather high level of independence.  
 
When assessing the degree of decentralisation, one should add however that the activities of the 
regions and municipalities are regulated by a number of laws and other regulations set at the central 
level, for instance with respect to standards for primary schools, obligations towards unemployed 
recipients of social benefits etc. The balance between allocation of responsibilities, control and 
financing is the core theme of the yearly negotiations between the Government and the 
organisations of the regions and the municipalities.  
 
Labour market policy and the Public Employment Service [Arbejdsformidlingen] have a special status, 
being the responsibility of the central government, but implemented by special bodies (Regional 
Labour Market Councils and labour offices) at the regional level. These institutions are not part of 
the structure of regional government, but belong to the central government.     
 
The Regional Labour Market Councils [Regionale Arbejdsmarkedsråd] are tripartite bodies with 
representatives both from trade unions, employers organisations, regional and local government. 
These councils are responsible for the management of regional labour market policy initiatives 
within the framework laid down at the central level. The system is based on a management-by-
objectives approach. Thus, the Regional Labour Market Councils receive a lump-sum for active 
measures and have a large discretion with respect to the actual allocation of funds between different 
programmes – typically in cooperation with public actors (e.g. educational institutions) or private 
actors (e.g. private training providers). Therefore, the Regional Labour Market Councils are 
important partners in local employment development.  
 
At the national level, a National Labour Market Council [Landsarbejdsrådet] has been set up with a 
similar composition. This Council acts in an advisory capacity to the Minister of Employment 
concerning, inter alia, such matters as the planning of labour market initiatives and the laying down of 
the framework for measures at the regional level.  
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1.1.4 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
 
Out of the total Danish number of wage earners of 2,656 million persons, 2,120 million persons 
were members of a trade union in 2004, giving a rate of organisation of about 80 percent. Of the 
organised workers, about two-thirds are members of the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO), while the remainder are members of various white-collar unions. In a detailed study of union 
membership from 2000, the rate of unionisation in the public sector is reported as very high 
(around 90 percent), while the rate in the private sector is 77 percent (Madsen, 2000). The rate is 
slight higher for women than for men (83 percent versus 80 percent) and significantly lower for 
those aged less than 30 years (69 percent versus 85 percent for the older workers). The 
unionisation rate is highest for skilled workers and employees with a short or medium cycle 
education.  
 
After two decades of increase, the membership of many trade unions, including Danish 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) has stagnated or declined in recent years – although it is still 
very high by international standards. Several reasons have been promoted for this development 
(Madsen, 2000):  
•  A demographic effect with a lower propensity of younger cohorts to become members of a 
trade union; 
•  Changing structure of employment by sectors and jobs-levels can have a negative influence on 
membership of those unions that recruit blue-collar workers from traditional industrial sectors; 
and  
•  Rising costs of membership; one cause is that the tax rebate has been lowered. The membership 
contribution is still deducted from taxable income, but the reduction in taxes is always 
calculated for the lowest level of marginal tax rates, not the for the marginal tax rate of the 
person’s actual income level, as was the previous rule. 
 
The principle of the “closed shop”, which until recently was a rule for about 10 percent of Danish 
wage earners, has now been declared illegal. Membership of a trade union is therefore voluntary, 
but in many work places there will be a strong social pressure of the employees to become 
members. Furthermore, the de-central character of wage bargaining and the strong role of shop 
stewards in the bargaining process probably acts as strong incentives for members, as does the close 
relation between the trade unions and the unemployment insurance funds.  
 
The share of wage earners covered by collective agreements is 100 percent in the public sector and 
77 percent in the private sector (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 2005: Table 6.1). .  
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1.2 RELATION BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
The balance and interplay between unemployment insurance, employment protection and ALMP are 
often summed up as being the main characteristics of the Danish flexicurity model in the following 
configuration:  
•  A flexible labour market with a high level of external numerical flexibility indicated by high levels 
of worker flows in and out of employment and unemployment;  
•  A low level of employment protection, allowing employers to adapt the workforce to changing 
economic conditions, makes the high degree of numerical flexibility possible;  
•  A generous system of economic support for the unemployed; and 
•  Active labour market policies aimed a upgrading the skills of those unemployed, that are unable 
to return directly from unemployment to a new job. 
 
It is important to emphasise that while the term “flexicurity” has only recently been associated with 
the Danish employment system, its basic characteristics have a long history. Thus while the current 
attention paid to the Danish model is caused by the significant reduction in unemployment since 
1993 and the high employment rate, one should not confuse this recent success with the creation of 
a fundamentally new version of the Danish employment system during the last decade. To the 
contrary one of the fascinating elements of the story about the Danish labour market is the fact that 
the model has been able to survive since the founding of the modern Danish welfare state in the 
1960s in spite of the economic turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore it has been successful 
in supporting the ongoing structural changes in the economy, which has kept Denmark in a position 
among the most affluent countries in the world. 
  
The Danish labour market model is often described as a ‘golden triangle’, cf. Figure1.2. The model 
combines high mobility between jobs with a comprehensive social safety net for the unemployed and 
an active labour market policy.  In fact the mobility (measured by job mobility, job creation, job 
destruction and average tenure) is remarkable high in an international comparison (Bingley et al., 
2000; Madsen, 2006). The high degree of mobility from employer to employer is definitely linked to 
the relatively modest level of job protection in the Danish labour market. Another reason could also 
be higher risk willingness among workers due to the comprehensive social safety net and probably 
also the low stigmatising effects of social security in Denmark.  
 
Despite one of the lowest levels of job protection among OECD-countries (OECD, 2004b: chapter 
2), Danish workers have a feeling of high job security among all subgroups of workers (Auer & 
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Casez, 2003). Also a recent Eurobarometer reported that a majority of more than 70 percent of the 
Danes found it a good thing to change jobs every few years.2  
 
Figure 1.2: The Danish flexicurity model  
Qualification effect 






























Source: Madsen (2006). 
 
The arrows between the corners of the triangle illustrate flows of people. Even if the unemployment 
rate is low in an international perspective (5.4 percent in 2004), Denmark almost has a European 
record in the percentage of employed which are each year affected by unemployment and receive 
unemployment benefits or social assistance (around 20 percent). But the majority of these 
unemployed persons manage to find their own way back into a new job. As an indication, the 
incidence of long-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment (6+ months, 12+ 
months) was in 2004 respectively 45 percent and 22.6 percent in Denmark compared to 60.4 
percent and 42.4 percent in EU(15). Those who become long-term unemployed end up in the target 
group for the active labour market policy, which – ideally – helps them to find employment again. 
The model illustrates two of the most important effects in this connection. On the one hand, as a 
result of the active measures, the participants in various programmes (e.g. job training and 
education) are upgraded and therefore improve their chances of getting a job. This is the 
“qualification effect” of ALMP. 
                                                  
2 See Eurobarometer Survey on Europeans and Mobility, 2006 
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/workersmobility_2006/uploaded_files/documents/FIRST%20RESULTS_Web%20version_06.02.06.pdf) 
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On the other hand, the measures can have a motivational (or threat) effect in that unemployed 
persons, who are approaching the time, when they are due for activation, may intensify their search 
for ordinary jobs, in case they consider activation a negative prospect. Thus one effect of labour 
market policy will be to influence the flow from unemployment benefits back to work, also for those 
unemployed, who do not actually participate in the active measures. A recent study has in fact 
argued that this motivational effect accounts for the major part of the macro-effect of ALMP 
(Rosholm & Svarer, 2004). 
 
The social safety net in the shape of unemployment benefit and social assistance for the unemployed 
together with the high flexibility form the main axis of the model, in the sense that both elements 
have been characteristic of the Danish labour market for many years. Recognition of the employers’ 
right to hire and fire at will date back to the September Compromise of 1899. Danish labour market 
parties here entered into an agreement that focused on labour market disputes and how to solve 
them, as well as the appropriate role of organisations in the system. This established centralised 
negotiations and mechanisms for resolving disputes also laid the foundation for the practice of self-
regulation by labour market parties in most matters of importance to the labour market.  
 
As described in more detail below, the Danish unemployment benefit system is based on the Ghent-
system. It has its roots in the early 1900s, and in its present form dates back to the late 1960s. A 
generous (by international standards) and primarily government-financed benefit support system was 
established in 1969 and fairly wide frames for support were adopted. Unemployment benefits and 
the state’s role in financing them were increased, eligibility requirements for insurance and 
unemployment benefits were reduced, and high levels of compensation for lost income were 
secured. In return, employers were exempted from compensating redundant employees, as this 
responsibility was taken over by the state. Consequently, employers have never had to secure 
employment and pay for redundancies, and the hiring and firing costs of Danish businesses have 
remained very low.  On the other hand, the active labour market policy stressing upgrading of skills 
and job training is relatively new. In its present form, it originates from the labour market reform of 
1993-94 and subsequent initiatives (Madsen, 2006). 
 
The Danish development of the welfare state and labour market points towards an interesting 
hybrid between the flexible, liberal welfare states characterised by high numerical flexibility (liberal 
hiring-and-firing rules) and the generous Scandinavian welfare regimes of high benefit levels. The 
hybrid model manages to reconcile the dynamic forces of the free market economy with the social 
security of the Scandinavian welfare states. Some writers may be inclined to call this hybrid unstable 
and bound to eventually head off in one or the other of the two directions (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
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However, when we have outlined the historical-institutional conditions behind the Danish flexicurity 
model below, it should be evident that this model is a result of a long evolutionary development, and 
is supported by relatively stable institutions and class compromises. 
 
Both in the international as well as in the Danish debate there has, from time to time, been a 
tendency to jump to the conclusion that the success of the last decade is a result of the flexicurity 
model just described. It is, however, essential to point out that the positive development in the 
Danish labour market since the early 1990s is not attributable exclusively to the Danish flexicurity 
model. Without a successful balancing of the macroeconomic policy and the trends in the 
international business cycle, the growth in employment and the falling unemployment would not 
have been possible. The coinciding of low inflation and a halving of registered unemployment rates is 
also a by-product of a new agenda for collective bargaining and wage formation, which helped the 
labour market adjust to the shift from high unemployment to full employment while keeping wage 
increases at a moderate level and not departing from the international trend towards low inflation. 
This agenda developed gradually during the 1980s and was formalised by a joint declaration of the 
social partners in 1987, where they stated that they would take the international competitiveness 
and macro-economic balance of the Danish economy into account during wage-negotiations.  
   
Table 1.1 sums up the main traits of the Danish system and its specific development in the 1990s.  
 
1.3 A  SHORT HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
This section provides a brief historical overview of the development of the Danish system of social 




Until the end of the 19th century social policy measures were virtually synonymous with poor relief, 
and only in the 1708 Poor Relief Act did help to the poor assume a relatively organised form; before 
this, the help offered consisted mainly of building poorhouses for those incapable of work and giving 
the poor permission to beg in their own parish. The Poor Relief Act of 1708 meant that each 
individual parish was given the responsibility of ensuring food, etc. for the poor of the parish who 
were incapable of work. The poor who were capable of work were sent to forced labour in, for 
instance, workhouses.  
                                                  
3 This section is based on excerpts from “Chapter 3: The conditions of life” published by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(www.um.dk) 
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Table 1.1: An overview of the Danish system of “flexicurity” 
 
 
Basic traits of the Danish system of 
“flexicurity” 
Specific developments in the 1990s 
Political environment  Strong corporatist structures 
Implicit social contract concerning 
balance between security and flexibility  
Broad political support for reforms of 
labour market policies 
Acceptance by social partners of need for 
wage restraint 
Decentralization of wage formation 
Macroeconomic 
environment 
Changing international economic 
conditions  
Active fiscal policy, but constrained by 
external balance 
Strong internal demand 
Favourable external balance 
Lower level of international inflation 
Employment situation  High employment rate (around 75 
percent) 
Shifting levels of open unemployment 
Rising share of persons receiving 
transfer income 
Significant reduction in both open and 
gross unemployment 






High by international standards  High by international standards 
Employment protection  Weak  Weak 
Unemployment benefits  Significant increase in compensation 
rate with reform in the late 1960s 
Cash benefits for non-insured 
unemployed 
Slow decline in compensation rate, but 
still high by international standards 
Reduction in the maximum  duration of 
unemployment benefits from 7 to 4 years 
Active labour market 
policy 
High expenditures on LMP in general 




Right and duty to early activation 
Source: Madsen (2006), Table 1 
 
In 1803 a tax was introduced to cover parishes' expenditure on poor relief. Recipients of poor relief 
had, after the introduction of a free constitution in 1849 no right to vote, and neither were they 
permitted to marry. An act of 1856 established the Fund for the Poor, which relied entirely on 
private donations, e.g. from church collection boxes; the Fund was aimed at giving relief before the 
poor were obliged to resort to the general system of poor relief and thereby lose their civil rights. 
 
In 1891 the Act on Support in Old Age was passed, together with a revised Law on Poor Relief; this 
ensured, for instance, public aid for medical care, midwifery services and burial. The introduction of 
support in old age was epoch-making. All those above 60 years of age and in need for social 
assistance were given the status of deserving poor, i.e. they were given relief without losing their 
right to vote, a break with the previous practice governing poor relief, which smacked of alms giving. 
In addition, it was no longer only the parishes that bore the financial burden, but the State now also 
made its contribution. 
 
18   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
In 1892 an Act on Health Insurance Societies was passed, encompassing a private, voluntary 
insurance principle with payment of contributions, but with a state subsidy. The idea of sickness 
benefit institutions built on a number of older, completely private health insurance societies, which 
provided members with various kinds of help during illness. Just prior to the passing of the Health 
Insurance Act, there were around 1,000 private health insurance societies with altogether over 
100,000 members. 
 
Similarly, in 1921, a compulsory Act on Disablement Benefits was introduced, ensuring the disabled 
help without the loss of civil rights. The many individual acts that had been passed in the period 
from about 1890 to 1930 were combined and simplified through the great Social Reform Act of 
1933. It was now generally established that financial aid to citizens as a result of some unforeseen 
occurrence should not limit civil rights; however, limitations were not completely abolished until the 
Public Assistance Act of 1961. 
 
After the Second World War social legislation reflected a constant development in the welfare 
state; a number of acts were introduced covering special cases of need, including one for the deaf 
(1950), the blind (1956) and the mentally deficient (1959). In 1956, on the basis of an agreement 
with the two sides in the labour market, a sick pay scheme was established. In 1958 arrangements 
for home help were established, replacing the previous arrangement for mother's helps. 
A new Act on National Pensions and Disablement Pensions (1956) introduced the principle that 
everyone had the right to a pension irrespective of capital and income, and independently of former 
employment and income. Everyone over 69 was thus given entitlement to a minimum national 
pension.  
 
In 1964 the Supplementary Pension Fund was introduced, a compulsory arrangement for employees, 
in which the pension depends on the contributions paid. 
 
In 1973 a compulsory health insurance programme was introduced, funded from general taxation, 
and replacing the sickness benefit funds, and at the same time a reform of daily cash benefits was 
introduced, ensuring everyone against loss of income resulting from illness. 
 
In 1976 the Social Assistance Act came into force. This introduced a single, unified structure, 
implying that the social assistance office in the local authority area must deal with the problems, 
irrespective of the reasons for social need. With this act, a principle of discretion was introduced, 
i.e. that support should be given from an overall evaluation of the client's situation. Since then a large 
number of changes have been made to the Social Assistance Act. Of central importance is that in 
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1987 the principle of discretion was changed to a principle of entitlement, which meant fixed rates 
for most forms of help. With effect from 1.7.1998, the Danish parliament passed a new Social 
Welfare legislation covering legal safeguards, social service, and active social policy. 
 
1.3.2 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY
4
 
With the industrialisation process, the trade unions took over the guilds’ tradition for mutual 
support to their members in the form of sickness insurance, unemployment insurance and 
employment service. Gradually the public sector stepped in and supported those schemes. An Act 
on Insurance against Accident came into force in 1898.  
 
In 1907 a law was passed that provided public support for the unemployment insurance funds 
established by the state unions and thus established the Danish version of the “Ghent system” that 
has survived to today. In contrast to the public social security, the public support to the 
unemployment benefit funds was given without implying the loss of civil rights for anyone receiving 
help.  
 
An anticipatory pension scheme (“Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme”) was introduced in 1979, 
making it possible for 60-66-year-old members of an unemployment benefit scheme to withdraw 
from the labour market before reaching pensionable age. This benefit, like subsequent arrangements 
for leave and activation was established largely with a view to reducing unemployment. 
 
Around WWII, labour market policy was gradually established as a separate policy area, distinct 
from social policy. Focus was no longer just on economic support for the unemployed, but also on 
labour mobility and wage formation. In 1969 the public employment service was established as a 
separate branch closely related to economic policy and embedded in a centralised system with 
strong corporatist elements. With the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s some convergence 
between the two systems was seen, mainly due to a more active profile for social policy. With the 
present reform of local and regional government that is described in more detail below, one may say 
that this convergence will take one step further. However, the distinction between those 
unemployed that are members of the unemployment insurance funds and the “un-insured” 
unemployed prevails, as a sign on the strong path dependency of this part of Danish society dating 
back more than a hundred years.  
 
                                                  
4 This section is built on Damgaard, 2003, chapter 3. 
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1.4 POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE DANISH MODEL 
 
This section outlines some of the major challenges facing the Danish flexicurity model in the next 
few years.5 The structure of the section mirrors the three corners of the flexicurity triangle.  
 
1.4.1 GLOBALISATION AND PERCEIVED JOB INSECURITY  
 
Globalisation and outsourcing of jobs to particularly South East Asia are often pointed out as the 
most important challenges to employment and welfare policy facing the Danish labour market, both 
at present and in the future. This has an effect on the employees’ sense of job security and thus on 
their mobility willingness. It is a condition for the employees’ willingness to change jobs or job 
functions that they feel secure, either at their present workplace or of their place on the labour 
market in general. All the media hype about globalisation and outsourcing has probably had a 
negative psychological effect on the mobility of the labour force. As already stated, the Danish 
labour market legislation and the collective agreements offer workers little job protection. It is this 
sense of job security and employment security that may be challenged by the threat of outsourcing 
jobs. It is also conceivable that e.g. employers have a strategic interest in inflating the ideas of the 
scale and nature of globalisation, as this rhetoric can help soften the trade unions and employees, 
and make them more accommodating of atypical forms of employment or lower wage demands. 
Skaksen (2004) maintains that the possibility of outsourcing in itself can have a disciplining effect in 
connection with collective bargaining, because wage restraint becomes an alternative to outsourcing 
of production. 
 
1.4.2 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES GLOBALISATION AFFECT JOBS? 
 
The question still remains, however, if there is empirical support for the expectations of massive 
outsourcing of jobs, and to what extent globalisation will in reality affect the flexibility of the labour 
market.  
 
The Danish National Institute of Social Research finds, on the basis of a study of sectors of industry 
particularly exposed to competition in the period 1997-2000, that competition from low-wage 
countries seems to have had few serious negative consequences for Danish workers (Geerdsen et 
al., 2004). The Board of Economic Advisers (DØR) estimates, after reviewing a number of Danish 
studies on outsourcing of jobs, that around 5,000 jobs disappear every year from Denmark as a 
direct consequence of outsourcing (DØR, 2004: 132). As approx 260,000 jobs disappear or are 
                                                  
5 For a more detailed exposition, see Bredgaard, Larsen & Madsen, 2006.  
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created every year, outsourcing seems to account for a rather modest share of the dynamics of the 
labour market. The research-based knowledge available – sparse as it still is – on the scope and 
nature of outsourcing and off-shoring of jobs thus calls for a more sober-minded assessment of the 
problem.     
 
Nevertheless, a number of factors seem to indicate that the particular Danish combination of high 
numerical flexibility, high social security and employment security means that both enterprises and 
workers are well armed to take up the challenge and meet the needs for change and adaptability 
constantly demanded by new technology and intensified national and global competition. The real 
challenge in connection with outsourcing of jobs may be to safeguard workers’ rights, consumer 
safety, environmental standards etc. in the receiving country.     
 
1.4.3 MOBILITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
 
The large number of job changes on the labour market means that the workforce is continually 
tested for their productivity and work potential. This constant selection process leads to some 
groups of employees being gradually excluded from the labour market if they fail to live up to the 
expectations of the employers. A large group of workers are thus more or less permanently 
balancing on the edge of the labour market or outside it. From 1960 to the mid-1990s, the number 
of people on transfer income grew from around 200,000 to 900,000 full-time persons, equivalent to 
a quarter of the adult population. The price for a highly efficient and mobile labour market with an 
extensive safety net therefore seems to be that a large part of the potentially active population of 
working age is gradually excluded from the labour market and become welfare recipients. It must be 
said, though, that the number of people on transfer income fell to approx. 800,000 by the end of 
2002. Since the early 1960s the employment rate has been stable at about 75%. The growth in the 
number of people on transfer income thus coincides with a marked decrease in the number of 
persons (especially married women) who are provided for by their family (Madsen, 2003).     
 
In contrast to this, the mix of the group of people on transfer income has changed considerably. 
Immigrants from third-world countries make up a growing share of social assistance recipients; they 
have considerably lower employment and participation rates than ethnic Danes, and this constitutes 
a huge and so far unsolved integration and labour market problem (Tænketanken, 2006). The 
number of long-term social assistance recipients also remained more or less unchanged during the 
1990s’ ‘job miracle’. The number of long-term sickness benefit cases also shows a marked increase 
in recent years, which may of course have any number of causes, including the ever-faster pace and 
productivity race in the labour market. As can be seen, there are still unsolved marginalisation and 
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social exclusion problem on the Danish labour market – although in a comparative perspective, they 
seem less severe than in other European countries (cf. Bredgaard, 2004a; 2004b). The low degree of 
job protection probably plays a double role in this connection for ‘weak’ groups on or outside the 
labour market. On the one hand, employers need not be fearful of hiring somebody from the so-
called weak groups as it is relatively easy to fire them again. On the other hand, employers may be 
less inclined to focus on prevention and retention of employees in the workplace. Thus both exit 
and entry into the Danish labour market are easy, also for disadvantaged groups.          
 
1.4.4 THE CHALLENGES TO INCOME SECURITY  
 
The high rate of income compensation in case of unemployment (up to 90% for certain low-income 
groups) increases the risk of economic disincentives, especially for low-income groups. Even though 
such incentive problems seem plausible, both theoretically and intuitively, they are nevertheless 
difficult to prove empirically, at least on a larger scale (cf. Goul Andersen et al,. 2003). One reason 
could be that potential disincentive problems, in particular in connection with the labour market 
policy, have been sought remedied in the form of tighter availability and mobility demands, early and 
intensive activation and the ‘right and duty’ to activation – rather than reductions in the level of 
benefits. 
  
1.4.5 CHALLENGES TO THE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
Since 2002 adjustments of the labour market policy have gradually moved the policy in the direction 
of more disciplining: the eligibility period for unemployment benefit has been further reduced, 
sanctions, availability and mobility rules tightened, and the skills upgrading elements reduced. At the 
same time there has been a gradual roll-back of the responsibilities of the regions and the social 
partners. When the labour market policy is re-calibrated towards more social disciplining (i.e. work 
first), it implies seeking to increase the motivational effect rather than the upgrading effect (i.e. 
human capital), which may be linked to some effect measurements of the activation measures, which 
have claimed, among other things, that education can in fact have a negative effect on the subsequent 
self-sufficiency rate of the individual, and that on the whole only private job placement can 
demonstrate any positive effects  (Geerdsen, 2003). Together with new evaluations, this provides 
the basis for increasing focus on the importance of the effects of motivation and threats in the 
labour market policies (Rosholm & Svarer, 2004). Typically, the effect evaluations made so far have 
focused on short-term effects of specific measures, whereas there is much less knowledge about the 
longer-term impact of combined measures, e.g. initiatives involving education and training followed 
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by work experience or subsidised job-training (cf. Hansen et al,. 2005 for an analysis of the long-term 
effects of educational measures). 
 
Giving lower priority to the training and education aspects of the active labour market policy may, 
however, have consequences for the flexibility on the labour market, especially in a situation where 
the individual’s reasons for unemployment are more related to the ability (lack of qualifications or 
work experience etc) than to his or her willingness to work (financial incentives) (cf. Goul Andersen 
et al,. 2003). A growing mismatch between the labour market policy’s ‘medicine’ and the patient’s 
‘illness’ can thus emerge, which will diminish the possibilities of (re)integrating the marginal groups 
of the labour market, to the detriment of both dynamics and flexibility on the labour market 
(Bredgaard, 2005). 
 
The intention of adopting a one-tier system instead of a two-tier system presents a number of both 
potential opportunities and risks in relation to labour market flexibility. There are, for instance, 
obvious advantages from coordinating the activities of the public employment service and those of 
the municipalities, i.e. the state and municipal labour market policy. However, localising labour 
market policy entirely to the municipalities runs counter to one of the previously fundamental 
principles of labour market policy: that employment policy is to be managed on the basis of 
functional, and not geographical, considerations (cf. Jørgensen et al,. 1999). An important point of 
criticism from labour market organisations has indeed been that a one-tier, municipalised 
employment system might hamper labour mobility across local authority boundaries.    
 
In spite of these breaches with traditional labour market policy, one thing remains unchanged – the 
role of the enterprises. Danish labour market policy is still very supply-side oriented, that is, 
oriented towards activating the unemployed. It has no tradition for involving and no instruments 
established to activate enterprises, apart from a policy of corporate social responsibility, which is at 
the moment considerably less ambitious than it used to be. In order to get more people employed 
and to increase the supply of labour it is, nevertheless, an essential precondition that enterprises on 
the one hand choose to retain employees in danger of social exclusion (e.g. older or disabled 
workers), and on the other hand help integrate people who have already been excluded (cf. 
Bredgaard, 2005).  
 
As already hinted throughout this summarised review of the challenges to the flexicurity triangle, the 
Danish flexicurity model is not an unchangeable construction. Changes are happening around all 
corners of the triangle important to the flexibility, dynamics and functioning of the labour market. It 
is important to bear in mind that there is a dynamic interaction between the flexible labour market, 
24   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
income security and the active labour market policy, and that changes in any one of these elements 
will therefore have consequences for the others. Each of the elements are being challenged at the 
moment by trends such as globalisation, changes in the security systems and changes to the labour 
market policy. The question then is whether any of these changes are of a scope and a nature which 
justifies talking about fundamental systemic changes, which will change the Danish flexicurity model 
for good, or whether what we are seeing are just minor alterations. It is probably still too early to 
tell. 
 
What is important to point out in this context is the fact that the precondition for the resilience of 
the model is continuous support from the social partners, and confidence in the ability of the model 
to secure a balancing of social and political compromises. The particular Danish variety of 
corporatism, in which the labour market parties are involved in the drafting of legislation and 
decision-making processes, and share responsibility for implementation, is no doubt an important 
condition for the development and robustness of the flexicurity model. It is on these points that the 
model will be facing challenges in the coming years, as a consequence of the ongoing local authority 
reforms, which will, among other things, have an effect on the social partners’ scope for influencing 
the policy and in the longer term also the design of the income provision system for the 
unemployed (e.g. as a result of a beginning blurring of boundaries between local authority economy 
and the unemployment benefit system).   
 
 
AIAS-UvA   25 Per Kongshøj Madsen 
26   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
 
2.1 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE SYSTEM 
 
As described above, Denmark is normally ranked as a country with a rather low level of 
employment protection (e.g. OECD, 2004: chapter 2). However, in reality the situation is somewhat 
more complex and implies different levels of protection for different groups. First of all, and as an 
important general observation, one should point to the fact that employment protection in 
Denmark is, to a large degree, seen as an issue to be handled by the social partners as part of the 
general negotiations over work and pay conditions. Therefore, one will find only limited legislation is 
this field. 
 
One important exception is, however, the “Law on salaried workers”, which regulates the 
employment conditions for large groups of white-collar workers. In the law itself, a salaried worker 
is defined as a person, who conducts office work, clinical work and similar functions or supervises 
the work of others. However, in many collective agreements it is stipulated that those workers 
covered by the agreement will have right as defined by the law, even if they are not covered by the 
definition in the law itself. It is the assessment that the majority of public employees and about half 
of the employees in the private sector are covered by agreements or regulations that follows the 
“Law on salaried workers”. 
  
The law stipulates among other things, a set of rules for dismissals, whose main content is a 
definition of the employer’s notice period in relation to the duration of employment. An increasing 
number of non-salaried workers in the private sector have, as parts of the negotiations between the 
social partners, been classified as “quasi-salaried worker” and therefore will experience a level of 
employment protection similar to those just described. Employers offending the protection of 
salaried or quasi-salaried will have to pay compensation to the former employee. However, the 
employer cannot be forced to reinstall the employee into employment. Apart from these groups, 
one may in the collective agreements for different groups and sectors find varying rules concerning 
employment protection. The lowest protection level is found in the construction sector, where one 
can find dismissal periods down to one or a few days. This is discussed in more detail in section 2.2.   
 
Concerning part-time workers, there are no specific regulations, with part-time workers being 
covered by the same regulations as full-time workers – a situation which is a general feature of the 
Danish labour market. Due to the rather low level of employment protection on the Danish labour 
market, the share of persons having a time-limited contract is rather low. The use of such contracts 
is now regulated by rules that implement the EU-regulations in this area. 
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Finally, one should mention that legislation has been introduced to ban the discrimination of 
pregnant women, when it comes to dismissals. Thus employers who dismiss pregnant women will 
have to prove that the dismissal had nothing to do with the pregnancy and face a fine and payment 
of compensation to the former employee, if this cannot be proved.  
 
Cases brought against employers for offending the regulations with respect to employment 
protection are handled by the separate legislative system that is established for the labour market.  
 
2.2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN PRACTICE 
 
Table 2.1 gives some examples of the notice periods for different groups of employees. As 
mentioned above, it is the assessment that the majority of public employees and about half of the 
employees in the private sector are covered by agreements or regulations that are equivalent to 
those of salaried workers in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Notice period by duration of employment and occupational group 
Duration of employment  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Construction worker  3 days 5  days  5  days 
Industrial worker  21 days  2 month  3 months 
Salaried worker and public 
employee 
3 months  4 months  6 months 
Source: Westerlund (2006), Table 5 
 
Similarly, Table 2.2 shows the severance pay, which is paid to salaried workers with a high tenure, 
but rarely to blue-collar workers.  
 
Table 2.2: Severance pay by duration of employment and occupational group 
  12 years   15 years  18 years 
Salaried workers  1 month’s wage  2 month’s wage  3 month’s wage 
Blue collar workers  Found in some collective agreements 
Source: Westerlund (2006), Table 6 
 
Unfortunately, there it is difficult to get a statistical overview of the functioning of the system of 
employment protection as a whole, because most of the conflicts are solved through arbitration at 
the firm level involving the local trade union representative and the local employer’s organisation. 
Only a few of the dismissal cases therefore reach the Court of Labour (see www.arbejdsretten.dk).  
 
A further observation to be made is that the low level of employment protection is correlated with 
a relatively small share of employees having an employment contract of limited duration. According 
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to the latest labour force survey for 2005 only 9.9 percent of the employees have such a contract. 
The share is highest – at about 20 percent - for young persons aged 15-29 years among which one 
will find many students having some form of temporary job. For the EU-15 the average share of 
persons with fixed term contracts is around 13 percent. There is a minor gender difference in the 
sense that 11.3 percent of the women have a temporary contract, while the share for men is 8.7 
percent.   
 
Concerning part-time work one should note that this is covered by the same agreements and 
regulations concerning dismissals as full time work.  
 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the anti-discrimination laws prohibits employers from 
dismissing employees due to pregnancy and also forbid discrimination due to gender, race, age etc.  
 
Turning to possible explanations for the low level of employment protection on the Danish labour 
market a few candidates are mentioned in the literature. 
 
Firstly one may point to the fact that although 62 percent of the employees are found in firms with 
more than 100 employees, the majority of Danish firms (defined as workplaces) are small. Of the 
283,000 firms existing in 2004, 78 percent had less than 10 employees, while 15 percent has 
between 10 and 49 employees. Only 3 percent had more than 50 employees.6 In such an 
environment it is less functional to impose large restrictions on the employer’s rights to dismiss 
staff.  
 
Secondly, almost all Danish Governments in the 20th century were based on coalitions involving 
centre parties – and on in a two-year period in the 1960s the Government was based on a socialist 
majority. Thus in contrast to for instance Sweden, it was politically difficult to impose strict EPL-
legislation based on a traditional interpretation of worker’s interests. Also in this area, Danish 
policy-making proved its tradition for class-compromise and consensus (Jørgensen, 2002).  
                                                  
6 Calculations based on the databanks of Statistics Denmark. 
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3 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
 
As stated in Section 1, the main features of the Danish system of unemployment insurance date back 
to the early years of the 20th century. It was given its present form in a large reform in 1969. The 
economic support to unemployed will come from either the unemployment insurance funds or from 
the social assistance system administered by the municipalities.  
 
3.1 THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
 
In the following sections the main features of the present system are explained. 
 
3.1.1 THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUNDS 
 
Unemployment insurance is regulated by a separate law and accompanying regulations. The chapters 
of the law determine in great detail: 
•  The criteria for becoming a recognised unemployment insurance fund (including a minimum of 
10,000 members); 
•  The criteria for becoming a members of a recognised fund; 
•  The rules for calculation and payment of unemployment benefits; 
•  The rules for the special Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme; 
•  The calculation of membership contributions; 
•  The calculation of the state contribution to the funds; 
•  The rules for employer’s obligation to pay the unemployment benefit during the first two days 
of unemployment of a previously employee; 
•  The sanctions imposed on members to receive benefits without being eligible to these; 
•  How the funds shall be supervised by the Labour Directorate; and 
•  The rights of members with respect to complaints over decisions made by the funds and the 
Labour Directorate. 
 
According to the law, sanctions will be imposed by the funds on individual members that receive 
unemployment benefits without being eligible (for instance if they are not available for work or do 
not actively look for work). The standard sanction is withdrawal of benefits for a shorter period of 
time (e.g. three weeks).  
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3.1.2 MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONS 
 
Membership of an unemployment insurance fund is voluntary. Members have to fulfil the following 
criteria: 
•  A member must stay and reside in Denmark. However, departures are made from this rule if 
the person resides in another EEA country; 
•  They must be between 18 and 63 years of age, when they join the unemployment insurance 
fund. The age limit of 63 years for joining the funds is due to the fact that one must have been a 
member for one year before being eligible to benefits and benefits are only paid to persons aged 
less than 65 years, which is the pension age for public old age pension (cf. below); 
•  They must have employment as an employed person or as a self-employed person or assisting 
spouse in a company owned by a self-employed; and 
•  A person can also be admitted as a member of an unemployment insurance fund if the person 
has completed a vocational training course of at least 18 months' duration when you apply for 
membership not later than 2 weeks after completion of the training course.  
 
Both full-time and part-time employees can become members of an unemployment insurance fund. 
Part-time insurance is an option for persons working less than 30 hours per week. Both 
membership contribution and unemployment benefits are lower for this group. Thus benefits cannot 
be higher than two-thirds of the benefits for a full-time insured person.  
 
3.1.3 MEMBERSHIP CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The membership contribution amounts to:  
•  A flat-rate compulsory contribution to the unemployment insurance, which is the same for all 
members and in 2006 amounts to 3,204 DKK pr year (430 Euro) 7; 
•  A flat-rate contribution to finance the Labour Market Supplementary Pension Scheme (the so-
called ATP-scheme); 
•  An administrative fee, which varies (considerably) between the individual unemployment 
insurance funds (cf. section 3.3.3 below); and 
•  A voluntary early retirement contribution for the Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme. The early 
retirement contribution in 2006 amounts to DKK 4,668 for full-time insured members. Early 
retirement contributions are payable only, if you want to be covered by the early retirement 
benefit scheme. The benefits paid under this scheme are related to the level of unemployment 
benefits and will not reflect the individual amounts contributed by the member, if the member 
                                                  
7 The current exchange rate is 7.44 DKK to 1 Euro (November 2006). 
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fulfils the eligibility criteria. These call for a certain minimum number years of having contributed 
to the scheme (at present 25 years). The member can retire from the age of 60 years.   
 
All membership contributions are tax deductible, which implies that the net cost to the member is 
about two-thirds of the gross cost.  
 
The amounts are adjusted at each turn of the year (according to the wage-index). An important 
observation is that the membership contribution is not based on actuarial considerations about risks 
of unemployment for individuals or group, but is uniform for all members, notwithstanding which 
fund they are members of.  
 
3.1.4 LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS  
 
To be entitled to unemployment benefits, the unemployed must in general fulfil the following 
conditions: (1) Have been a member of an unemployment insurance fund for at least one year; and 
(2) For persons insured on a full-time basis, the employment requirement means that they must 
have had employment to such an extent that it altogether corresponds to employment during the 
full, normal working hours of the trade or profession for a minimum of 52 weeks within the past 3 
years. If the full, normal working hours are 37 hours a week, the employment requirement for full-
time insured members will amount to a total of 1,924 hours of work within the past 3 years. 
 
Furthermore the unemployed must look actively for work and is subject to the rules and regulations 
of active labour market policy (cf. below). In principle an unemployed person, who has been 
unemployed for more than 3 months, must accept any job offered by the Public Employment Service 
(PES) that the person can perform. By example an unemployed academic must willing to work as a 
postman. However, in practice the PES is not very strict implementing this rule, because of the 
expected lack of motivation of the unemployed if actually employed in the job.  
 
Taking part in labour market training will not make the unemployed eligible for an extension of the 
benefit period. Not complying with this will lead to suspension of benefits and ultimately to 
expulsion from the insurance system. Suspension can be for one week and up to 26 weeks.  For 
2004, the statistics of the Directorate of Labour shows that approx. 3,500 persons had their benefits 
suspended for more than 3 weeks (Arbejdsdirektoraret, 2005). 
 
The benefit rate is individual and depends, among other things, on the size of the previous earned 
income. Unemployment benefits can, at a maximum, amount to 90 percent of previous earnings. 
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The maximum benefit rate in 2006 is 667 DKK (90 Euro) per day for full-time insured members. 
Unemployment benefits are paid out for 5 days a week. The maximum yearly benefit is therefore 
173,420 DKK (23,278 Euro).  
 
Once being eligible for unemployment benefits, an unemployed person may collect them for a total 
period of 4 years, if s/he follows the directions concerning active job seeking and participation in 
active labour market programmes (cf. below). After the end of the four-year period, the 
unemployed looses the right to unemployment benefits and will have to apply for cash benefits as an 
“un-insured” unemployed, cf. below. The right to benefits is also automatically lost at the age of 65 
years, where the person will qualify for old-age pension.   
 
3.1.5 THE NON-INSURED UNEMPLOYED 
 
Apart from those having exhausted their right to unemployment benefits, the group of “non-
insured” unemployed consist of those unemployed, which do not fulfil the criteria for becoming 
eligible to unemployment benefits in the first place (cf. the list of criteria presented above). Thus 
group of unemployed must apply for cash-benefits administered by local government (the 
municipalities). Cash benefits are means-tested and the amount depends on the family-situation of 
the unemployed. By example a person aged 25 and more and having children will receive 139,500 
DKK per year (18,725 Euro), while a young person aged 24 and less will receive 67,656 DKK per 
year (9,081 Euro). The duration of cash-benefits is not limited, but again the person will have to 
accept the offers from the municipality to participate in active programmes. If not, cash-benefits may 
be reduced or abolished all together. 
 
These benefits are thus considered as parts of social policy and regulated by a separate law under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Employment.  Financing is shared between national Government 
and the municipalities. 
 
Complaints over cash benefits (eligibility and calculations of amounts) are handled by a separate 
public body under the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
 
3.2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
The Labour Directorate, which is a separate body under the Ministry of Employment, is responsible 
for the implementation of the law on unemployment insurance and for supervising the activities of 
the unemployment insurance funds. The Directorate of Labour also handles complaints from 
34   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
members over the administrative decisions made by an unemployment insurance fund. The tight 
supervision is of course due to the fact that the unemployment insurance funds are responsible for 
administering large amounts of public money. 
 
Each unemployment insurance fund is formally an independent association, where the members 
elect a board, which again is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the fund. In practical term, 
since most of the funds are closely connected to one or more trade unions, the election of the 
boards is heavily influenced by the trade unions and is rarely subject to much debate among the 
members. A further reason for this is of course that the tight public regulation of the system 
(including the benefit levels) leaves little room for discussions about the activities of the individual 
fund. 
 
At the national level the unemployment insurance funds have formed a national organisation, which 
presents the interests of the funds vis-à-vis the Labour Directorate and the political system.  
 
The Directorate of Labour is responsible for the recognition of new funds and for supervising the 
legality of the existing funds. To become registered as an unemployment insurance fund and to 
remain within the system, the fund has to have at least 10,000 members. If a fund does not fulfil the 
criteria or live up the regulations, the Labour Directorate can withdraw the public funding totally or 
partly.  
 
One recent trend in the development of the funds has been related to a series of benchmarking 
exercises conducted by the Directorate of Labour. The studies revealed considerable differences in 
the cost levels and efficiency of the funds and therefore has put more focus on the size of the part 
of the membership contributions, which is related to the administrative costs of the funds. This has 
lead to an increased competition among the funds. The competition has furthermore been 
stimulated by recent changes in the legislation, which makes it easier for individuals to choose 
between different funds (the principle of free choice among unemployment insurance funds).  
 
As part of the attempts to give a more active and job-oriented profile to social policy, the 
responsibility of the non-insured unemployed at the national level was moved from the Ministry of 
Social Affairs to the Ministry of Employment in 2001. Also, as part of the so-called structural reform 
of the public sector in 2007, responsibility for active measures for both the insured and the non-
insured unemployed will be integrated into “job centres” in the municipalities, but without 
integrating the responsibility for the financing and payment of benefits to the two groups.  
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Parallel to the cash benefits for the non-insured unemployed, the municipalities are also responsible 
for the other elements of social policy, including administration and payment of sickness benefits and 
other social benefits (e.g. disability benefits). 
 
The Danish unemployment benefits system therefore still has the character of a two-tier system 
divided into the members and the non-members of the unemployment insurance funds. Although 
the overall organisation of Danish labour market policy is right now being reformed as part of the 
general structural reform of the public sector (cf. below), this two-tier system will remain intact in 
the foreseeable future. Apart from this two-tier character, the system is nationwide and uniform in 
the sense that it does not differ across sectors or occupational groups.  
 
Finally, one should mention that as a reflection of the anticipated need of some wage earners to 
supplement the normal benefits of the unemployment insurance funds, a number of funds and trade 
unions have during the last five years introduced supplementary unemployment insurance schemes, 
in cooperation with private insurance companies. The schemes are marketed as part of the attempts 
of the unions to attract members by offering a new package of services (also including for instance 
individual career advice, further education, discounts on vacation etc.). 
 
Since the premiums are calculated a purely actuarial basis, the premiums paid are rather high 
compared to the level and duration of the supplementary benefits and it is also subject to frequent 
changes depending on the development in the risk of unemployment. By example at present, an 
office worker wanting to have a supplementary benefit during a maximum of 12 months of 
unemployment amounting to a sum equal to the normal amount of benefit, will have to pay a 
premium of about the same size a the normal membership contribution to the unemployment 
insurance fund (the latter having a maximum benefit period of four years).  
 
The maximum coverage offered by the insurer may amount to twice the amount of normal benefits, 
but with a total maximum of normal benefits and supplementary benefits of about 80-90 percent of 
previous income. Since there are no laws regulating the supplementary insurance schemes, the 
coverage and prices are based solely of the insurer’s assessments of actuarial risks and other costs 
of the schemes.  
 
In 2004 it was estimated by the Danish Insurance Association that 1.7 million of the nearly 2.4 
million members of unemployment insurance funds had the opportunity to take such a 
supplementary insurance, because their unemployment insurance fund had a agreement with a 
private insurance company (Forsikring & Pension, 2004: p.14). There are no comprehensive statistic 
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showing the total number of persons actually having taken such an insurance, but it is estimated that 
the number is a low as 50,000 persons or about 3 percent of the potential number. However, the 
Danish Insurance Association expects the share to rise rapidly in the coming years due to the low 
level of coverage offered by the normal unemployment insurance funds, when it comes to wage 
earners with medium or high incomes.  
 
3.3 FIRST ORDER EFFECTS 
 
3.3.1 REPLACEMENT RATES  
 
As presented in the description of the calculation of unemployment benefits, they amount to 90 
percent of previous earnings (normally calculated over a three month’s period before becoming 
unemployed). There is a maximum amount, at present equal to approx. 14,500 DKK per month. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, this implies that the gross compensation rates declines rapidly with previous 
income, when the income reaches a limit of about 200,000 DKK per year. To give an impression of 
the groups actually experiencing the different levels of gross compensation one can mention that a 
wage earner in the private sector at the lowest income level would get about 175,000 DKK (excl. 
pension) per year in 2005, while an average salesperson would get 235,000 DKK per year. A highly 
skilled white-collar worker would earn 457,000 DKK per year (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 2006: 
Table 5.28).  
 
The OECD calculates the net compensation rates for different family types and income levels 
(Figure 3.2). As it is evident from this figure – and as a consequence of the limit on the 
unemployment insurance benefit -  wage-earners earning 2/3 of the average production worker 
(APW) experiences a significantly higher rate of compensation than the average worker. Also, the 
family situation plays a (limited) role, which is not due to the unemployment insurance system, but 
related to other benefits (like housing benefits), which are included in the OECD-calculations.  
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 Source: LO (2006), Figure 3.1 
 




















APW-level 2/3 of APW-level
 
Source: OECD (2004): Benefits and Wages 2004, Tables 3.1b and 3.3b 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, over the last decades there has been a tendency for the compensation 
rates to decline, which has caused some debate. The main reason for the decline is a special and 
rather complicated system for indexing the development of unemployment benefits (and other 
transfer incomes) to the increase in average wages. The main element of the indexation involves 
regulating unemployment benefits with the percentage increase in yearly wages (excluding pensions 
and paid absence) two years before with a deduction of 0.3 percentage points. This deduction is 
used to finance targeted measures for special groups among the unemployed and other “weak 
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groups”. Furthermore the introduction of collective pension schemes among blue-collar workers 
has led to a decline in the compensation rates, because contributions to such schemes are not 
included in the calculation of unemployment benefits. As a result, the compensations rates (including 
pension contributions) have gradually declined since 1982, as shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3: Compensation rates for different groups of blue-collar workers 1982-2004.   
 
 Note: “Elektriker” = electrician, “Gnst. LO-arb” = average LO-worker, “Lagerarbejde”= warehouse worker, ”Murer” = 
bricklayer, “Tømrer”= carpenter, “Rengøring” = cleaning 
Source: LO (2006), Figure 3.3. 
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Source: LO (1996), Figure 2.1 
 
Finally, as shown in Figure 3.4, the purchasing power of unemployment benefits has been almost 
unchanged over the period 1982-2004, but with large fluctuations mainly due to different shifts in 
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the indexation of the benefits, including the years 1983, 1984 and 1985, where the benefits were 
“frezeed” (meaning not regulated at all). 
 
3.3.2 COSTS AND FINANCING 
 
As previously described, the major part of unemployment insurance is financed by the state.  The 
total expenditure for unemployment benefits was 20,405 million DKK in 2005. The other major 
payments from the unemployment insurance funds are for the voluntary early retirement pay, which 
amounted to 24,147 million DKK in the same year. The costs are covered from three sources: the 
mandatory contributions to unemployment insurance from the members, the voluntary membership 
contributions to the Voluntary Early Retirement Pay (VERP) and the states. Table 3.1 gives an 
overview. 
 
Table 3.1: Revenue and costs of the Danish unemployment insurance system, 2005 
Item  Amount (million DKK) 
Unemployment benefits  20,405 
Voluntary Early Retirement Pay  24,656 
Total expenditures  45,061 
Covered by:   
Membership contribution to UI (mandatory)  7,068 
Contribution to VERP (voluntary)  5,712 
State contribution  32,281 
Source: Data provided to the author by the Directorate of Labour 
 
To the costs in Table 3.1 can be added the administrative costs of the Labour Market Directorate 
(approx. 180 million DKK) and the administrative costs of the individual unemployment insurance 
funds (covered by the members). In 2004 the total administrative costs of the unemployment 
insurance funds amounted to 3,300 million DKK (Arbejdsdirektoratet, 2005, p. 15). One may also 
add the costs of the active labour market programmes for the insured unemployed members of the 
funds, which adds up to 7,518 million DKK.  
 
In 2005 the total administrative costs of the unemployment insurance funds were 3,200 million 
DKK, which was covered by the membership contributions. Thus, of the total memberships 
contributions about 20 percent covers the administrative costs of the funds, while 44 percent is the 
mandatory membership contribution to the unemployment benefits and the remainder 36 percent 
are contributions to the voluntary early retirement scheme.  
 
Since the state covers all variations in the expenditures of benefits through the state budget, no 
special funds are accumulated. Membership contributions are not regulated according to the general 
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level of unemployment or the unemployment risks of the individual member or groups of members. 
The only factor that makes the membership contributions differ between the funds is the variations 
in the administrative costs of each fund, cf. below.  
 
Since the funds are formally private organisations, they could in principle suffer bankruptcy, if for 
some reason they were not able to cover their administrative costs due to lack of membership. 
However, no such examples have been seen. The normal procedure for an unemployment insurance 
fund in financial trouble is to merge with another fund. This will also be the case, if a fund fails to 
fulfil the criteria for a minimum number of members of 10,000 persons.  
 
3.3.3 THE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUNDS 
 
Since 2001, the Directorate of Labour has conducted regular studies of the administrative efficiency 
of the unemployment insurance funds. On average the funds spend 6 DKK on administrative 
purposes for every 100 DKK that they pay to their members.  The total number of employees in 
2005 was about 5,000, a slight reduction by 5.5 percent from the level in 2000 (Arbejdsdirektoratet, 
2005)  
 
It is however a striking observation that there are large differences between the administrative costs 
per member between the cheapest and the most expensive fund (in the range from 624 DKK to 
2,748 DKK per year). The level of unemployment of the members and the number of 
unemployment spells per member will of course play a role in explaining these differences. So will 
the number of local offices and service level. However, measured per transaction there are still huge 
disparities, which must be explained by differences in the level of productivity. Thus the unit cost of 
a transaction differs with a factor of three between the least efficient and the most efficient fund. 
According to the Directorate of Labour this points to a considerable potential for lowering the 
administrative costs of the insurance funds, which is of course one of the main aims of this 
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4 ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 
 
4.1 THE ORGANISATION OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
4.1.1 AT PRESENT: A TWO-TIER SYSTEM 
 
An important feature of the present system of labour market policy is its two-tier nature, which 
follows the dividing lines in the unemployment insurance system.  At the individual level, the dividing 
line is therefore between those unemployed, who are members of an unemployment insurance fund, 
and those who are not and therefore eligible for means-tested social welfare. The former group is 
managed by the regional labour market authorities, and the latter are the responsibility of the 
municipalities. Since the two groups often have the same kind of difficulties, the set of instruments 
used, the timing of programmes (and also the level of benefits) are to a large degree parallel 
between the two systems.  
 
Measured in numbers, the municipalities take responsibility for almost half of the total number of 
unemployed persons in active measures and thus play a key role in the implementation of active 
labour market policies. This is also the main reason for the present efforts to integrate the state 
system for the insured unemployed with the activities of local government, cf. below. 
  
At level of the municipalities and in order to coordinate the activities of the actors involved in social 
and labour market policy at the local level, social coordination committees [sociale koordinationsudvalg] 
are established by law. A social coordination committee is a committee which is to advise the 
municipal authorities about preventive social measures. The committee is to contribute to 
developing the cooperation between the municipal authorities and various partners in the public and 
the private sector (including the social partners) in relation to their labour market programmes. The 
aim of the work of the coordination committees is to ensure that as many people as possible are 
given a chance of preserving their labour market attachment or becoming integrated on the labour 
market. The committees are thus to contribute to promoting employment opportunities for 
persons who are at risk of losing their job or persons with difficulties in obtaining employment on 
ordinary terms. 
 
A coordination committee is composed of representatives of the municipal authorities, the social 
partners, medical advisers, handicap organisations and the public employment service. Each social 
coordination committee will cover a single or only a few municipalities. Compared to the Regional 
Labour Market Councils, the social coordination committees have only limited resources for 
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financing their own project and therefore act mainly as instruments for exchange of information and 
coordination of various activities.  
 
4.1.2 THE STRUCTURAL REFORM AND THE REORGANISATION OF LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
In 2006 and 2007 the so-called “Structural Reform” will imply major changes of the Danish public 
sector. The number of municipalities will be reduced from the present level of 271 to around 98. 
The 14 counties will be replaced by 4 regions having the health care system as their major 
assignment. A separate set of regions will be established with respect to labour market policy, cf. 
below. 
 
The present 14 labour market regions (each headed by a director and a tripartite council) will be 
replaced by 5 labour market regions – each still with a tripartite council. The latter will however 
have lesser responsibilities that before. The reform thus implies two important changes compared 
to the present set-up: 
•  The role of local government in implementation of labour market policy will increase; and  
•  The influence of the social partners is reduced (probably as the outcome of some resistance 
from the present Conservative-Liberal Government and the Ministry of Employment towards 
the more powerful role of the social partners under the previous system). 
 
At the level of the municipalities, the reform implies the creation of new job centres – one for each 
municipality.  The job centres will be responsible for both the insured and the uninsured 
unemployed and will thus combine the tasks, which are now solved by the social assistance branch 
of the municipalities and the public employment service. However, apart from 10 pilot job centres, 
the formal legal responsibility for the unemployed will still be divided between a state-branch and a 
municipality-branch of each job centre. The model is thus a hybrid between a one-tier and a two-
tier system.8  
 
A major advantage of the new institutional set-up is that it – albeit still formally a two-tier system – 
allows for a much closer coordination and cooperation between the civil servants from the 
(present) public employment service and the social assistance branch of the municipalities. Thus the 
competences of the former PES-staff (focused on the demand for labour) and the social assistance 
                                                  
8 For an official overview of the reform, see http://www.bm.dk/fremtidig_beskaeftigelsesindsats/default.asp. A more recent 
detailed description of the tasks of the new job centres can be found on the homepage of Local Government Denmark: 
http://www.kl.dk/336499/ in the publication: “Temaguide om beskæftigelsesområdet – opgaveændring og sammenlægning”, 
October 13, 2005.  For a recent overview of the new organisation  of  employment policy, reference can be made to 
Arbejdsdirektoratet (2006): Styring, planlægning og opfølgning i det nye beskæftigelsessystem, København (www.adir.dk) 
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officers (focused more on the social problems of the individual clients) will come together in the 
new job centres.  
 
The reform should also allow for a more transparent administrative system and reduce the need for 
sending both unemployed and firms from one public office to another. In principle the job centres 
will be able to handle all labour market related matters.  
 
A third advantage is that the new system provides a simpler line-of-command from the national to 
the local level. An important reflection hereof is that the legal basis for active labour market policy 
will be included in a single act compared to the present situation, where you have separate pieces of 
legislation for the state branch (the PES) and the municipalities.  
 
While the reform has, not surprisingly, been strongly supported by the representatives of local 
government, it has met strong criticism from both the social partners and a number of independent 
observers. The major points raised in this connection are the following. 
 
At the local level the hybrid character of the new job centres with two categories of staff (the state 
employed and those employed by local government) and a corresponding divided management may 
create problems in the implementation and functioning of the reform. In the original proposal for 
the reform, a total transfer of the PES-staff to the municipalities was foreseen, but during the 
political process the present result came out as a compromise between different political parties. A 
review of the reform will take place in 2010 and will include the experiences from the 10 pilot 
centres, where a full integration takes place.  
 
Given the limited size of the labour market, which is covered by each job centre, there is a risk that 
labour market policy will become too local in its focus and not take the larger regional (im)balances 
into account. An important task of the new regional organisation is of course to reduce this risk, but 
the problem is whether the new authorities at the regional level are powerful enough to overrule 
local interests. For the largest of the new municipalities and for lower skilled groups, the 
disadvantages from a narrow local focus are probably limited. However, about half of the new 
municipalities will have less than 50,000 inhabitants and for them – and for higher educated groups 
like academics - the geographical area covered by each of the new the job centres may be too small.  
 
The smallness of some job centres also entails the risk of lack of specialised competences, when it 
comes to specific groups on the labour market. Here again academics can be mentioned as an 
example. 
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In the reform, this risk is expected to be controlled through further extending the use of private 
service providers (in Danish terminology often refereed to as “other actors”). While this may solve 
the problem due to lack of competences in the smaller job centre, it also raises new demands on 
the specific skills needed to handle such private service providers, when it comes to defining 
contractual terms and the economic and legal incentives to be applied.  
 
A further set of issues linked to the implementation of the reform at the local level is related to the 
relation between the economic resources for labour market policy and the economy of the local 
government as a whole. Given the risk of having the claims for resources for active labour market 
policy compete with other local spending (like care for the elderly or childcare), the reform implies 
water-tight sheds between spending for labour market purposes and other spending. This however 
raises the question of how to create economic incentives for the municipalities to an efficient used 
of resources allocated to labour market policy, if the economic gains from a more active effort are 
not available for other purposes. At present the whole set-up concerning the economic aspects of 
the reform are not fully transparent.  
 
Finally, at a more practical level, the integration of the different administrative systems (including IT-
systems) used by the municipalities and the PES poses a whole set of administrative and technical 
challenges, which will have to be overcome during the next year. 
 
At the regional level, the weakening of the competences regional labour market boards entails the 
risk of dismantling the tradition for a having an overarching plan for creating a better match between 
regional demand for and supply of labour.  
 
Concerning the implementation of a national strategy for labour market and employment policy, the 
reform on the one hand increases, as mentioned above, the potential for implementing such a 
strategy. But on the other hand, Denmark has a long tradition for self-determination at the level of 
municipalities, exemplified by having the municipalities collect their own taxes. There is therefore a 
risk that the new and larger municipalities will pay more attention to local political interests than to 
strategies formulated at the national level. On the other hand, if the response by the Ministry of 
Employment is to tighten the use of detailed regulations and indicators in monitoring policy 
implementation, one outcome could be a more mechanical and standardised use of instruments than 
under the present system.  
 
A final challenge for the new system is to engage the social partners in the implementation of labour 
market policy. This engagement has, under the present system, been supported by the fact that the 
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participants in the tripartite bodies at the regional level had a major influence over the allocation of 
economic resources for active measures. Given that this is no longer the case, one can question the 
enthusiasm with which the social partners will engage themselves in the new system of governance. 
There is a danger that their positive engagement will turn into negative criticism of activities over 
which, they have had little or no influence.  
 
4.1.3 THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM9
 
At the local and regional level, 2006 will be a year of transition from the old to the new structure – 
not only with respect to labour market policy, but for local and regional administrative and political 
bodies in general.  
 
During the first half of 2005, the National Labour Market Authority [Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen] has had 
a dialogue with the municipalities concerning the establishment of the job centres. In the fall of 2005, 
this dialogue take place between the municipalities and the now appointed new “employment 
directors” of the four regions.10 During the first quarter of 2006 the ten pilot job centres will be 
appointed. Also during 2006 the new job centres will be established in all municipalities and ready to 
start work on January 1, 2007. Also procedures for transferring the (unemployed) jobseekers to the 
new system have been outlined.  
 
The rather complicated nature of this process (included the need for “dialogue” between the 
different levels) is of course partly due to the political autonomy of the Danish municipalities, which 
under the legislation have a high degree of self-governance.11
 
As mentioned above, the reorganisation of labour market policy will from 2007 imply the 
establishment of joint local “job centres” integrating the activities of the municipalities and the Public 
Employment Service. Hitherto the division of labour has been that the municipalities have been 
responsible for the unemployed, who were not members of an unemployment insurance fund, while 
the PES has taken care of the insured unemployed. Now a more integrated system will be 
introduced. The exact organisation of the “job centres” has been the cause of some political turmoil 
A model has now been chosen, where the vast majority of municipalities will have a job centre, 
                                                  
9 On the homepage of the National Labour Market Authority, a detailed description of this process can be found 
(http://www.ams.dk/jobcenterguide/Proces/) 
10 The “employment directors” (beskæftigelseschefer) is a new category of civil servants responsible for the practical 
implementation and management of the state tier of the new regional and local system. At the regional level, four “regional 
directors” (regionsdirektører) will also be appointed. Their role will be of a more strategic nature, although the exact division of 
tasks between the two types of “directors” is not entirely clear-cut.  
11 For a brief exposition in English of the extent of self-governance in Denmark, reference can be made to the homepage of the 
organisation Local Government Denmark (http://www.kl.dk/296095/) 
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which is still two-tier in its organisation. The care for the insured unemployed will be in the hands of 
a state-run section of the job centre, while the non-insured unemployed will be handled by a section 
under control of local government.  
 
Only in about ten regions a truly integrated job centre will be established (as a pilot-scheme) with all 
unemployed being under the auspices of the local government (the municipality). Not surprisingly, 
this mixed system of governance has given rise to some criticism and fear of huge implementation 
problems.   
 
4.1.4 THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
 
The autonomy of local government is reflected in the fact that both the regions and the 
municipalities have their own national organisations (Danish Regions [Amtsrådsforeningen] and Local 
Government Denmark [Kommunernes Landsforening]). Both organisations play a key role, when tasks 
and resources are allocated between the different levels of government for instance during the 
yearly negotiations on the state budget. The two organisations are also are actively involved in 
preparing the National Action Plans for Employment (NAPs).  
 
One should furthermore note that when it comes to labour market and employment policy, the two 
organisations are seen as much as representative of “social partners” as of the local and regional 
level. This is due to the fact that they are both large employers. Together they employ almost 
700,000 persons equal to more than 25 percent of total employment. The 275 Danish municipalities 
alone employ almost 500,000 persons. In many local areas they constitute the largest employer.  
 
4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
Given the complex governance system found on the Danish labour market with a mix of legislative 
regulation (including implementation of EU-regulations) and regulation through agreements between 
the social partners, it is hard to define precisely the relation between the responsible institutions of 
active labour market policy. Important elements in the system of responsible institutions can 
however be identified by studying Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: The organisational structure of the Ministry of Employment 
 
 
The diagram shows the internal administrative structure of the Ministry of Employment as of 2006. 
Of main interest in the present context are the National Directorate of Labour and the National 
Labour Market Authority. The former is responsible for the unemployment insurance funds and also 
(not shown) for the economic support from the municipalities to the non-insured unemployed. The 
latter is responsible for the operation of the Public Employment Service and (from 2007) for the 
new integrated job centres in the municipalities.  
 
Not shown in the diagram are the corporatist bodies at national, regional and local level. Most of 
their names and tasks will change with the reform implemented in 2006-2007, cf. Table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1: Corporatist bodies at national, regional and local level before and after January 1, 2007 
Until 2007  From 2007 and onward 
Level  Name  Main tasks  Name  Main tasks 
National National 
employment council 





Advisory body to the 
Minister of 
Employment 
Regional Regional  labour 
market council 
Implementing active 
labour market policy 


















4.3 PARTICIPANTS IN ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
The total number of participants in programmes of active labour market policy (including leave 
schemes) was 117,700 people in the forth quarter of 2005, which represents a minor decrease from 
the peak level of 121,300 people in the fourth quarter of 2004 (see Figure 4.1). However, the total 
number has been surprisingly stable over the last two years, in spite of the strong decline in open 
unemployment. This has – not surprisingly – stimulated debates about the extent to which active 
labour market programmes are effective in getting the participants back into employment. The 
stable number of persons in subsidised employment hides a continued of the number of persons in 
“flexi-jobs”, which are jobs for persons with a permanent reduction in their employability. These 
kinds of jobs are increasingly used as an alternative to invalidity pensions.  
 
Figure 4.2: Number of participants (full-time equivalents) in active labour market policy measures, first quarter of 

















Total Counselling and education
Subsidised employment Other schemes (incl. Leave)
 
Note: “Leave” mentioned under other schemes is the old parental leave scheme introduced in 1993, which is currently being 
phased out.  
Source: Databanks of Statistics Denmark.  
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Figure 4.2 shows the participants in active labour market policy the period 1995-2005 (excluding 
participants in flexi-jobs). The Figure has information about the main programmes of Danish active 
labour market policy: 
•  Job training with a wage subsidy implies that the unemployed is paid a normal wage from a public 
or private employer for a limited time period (up to one year).  
•  Special job training is for weaker groups of unemployed and will typically take place in special 
projects in the public sector.  
•  Support to self employment (a three year subsidy equal to 50 percent of benefits) was phased 
out from 1998. The programme is now closed.  
•  Education covers a wide range of education and labour market training with a duration up to 
one year. 
•  Counselling includes job search activities etc. 
•  Targeted measures are programmes targeted at special groups like immigrants or older worker.  
  













1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
General Jobtraining Individual Jobtraining
Support to the unemployed starting enterprises Educational  measures for the unemployed
Counselling and job search Programmes for special target groups
Source: Databanks of Statistics Denmark.  
 
Mainly as a reflection of the improved conditions on the Danish labour market the number of 
participants has been falling in recent years. At the same time – and reflecting a deliberate policy 
shift of the present government – more emphasis has been put on job-training with private 
employers and on counselling under the heading “work-first”. Lower priority is given to educational 
measures. Also targeted measures have grown in importance due to the increased emphasis on the 
integration of immigrants and descendants.  
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5 PERFORMANCE 
 
5.1 LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF DIFFERENT GROUPS 
 
Looking at the level of labour market integration measured by employment and unemployment 
rates, Table 5.1 presents some of the main observations.  
 
Table 5.1: Key indicators on labour market integration in Denmark and EU-15, 2003 
Denmark  EU-15   
Percent 
Employment rates:     
    All age groups 15-64 years  75.1  64.3 
    15-24 years  59.6  39.7 
    24-54 years  83.5  77.2 
    54-64 years  60.2  41.7 
Part time employment rate  21.3  18.6 
Unemployment rate  5.6  8.1 
Youth unemployment  (as share of total population aged 15-24 
years) 
6.8 7.3 
Long term unemployment  1.1  3.3 
Source: LFS-data from European Commission, 2004, statistical annex. 
 
The table reveals the well-known characteristics of the Danish labour market, when compared to 
the rest of the EU: a high employment rate and a low unemployment rate, also when it comes to 
long-term unemployment.  One notes the very high employment rate for young persons, which 
reflects mainly the widespread habit of combining study and work. Part-time rate is a little above 
average due to the rather high level of female employment combined with the fact that more 
women are working part-time. 
 
Concerning employment rates, one of the characteristic aspects of the Danish labour market is the 
high employment rate for both men and women in all age groups, cf. Figure 5.1.12 Thus, the female 
employment rates are almost equal to those of males, except for the age groups between 25 and 34 
years, where caring for small children is reflected in a somewhat lower employment rate. In a 
comparative perspective one may add, however, that the employment rates for Danish women are 
among the highest in the European Union, also when it comes to women with small children 
(Eurostat, 2005). 
 
                                                  
12 The definition of employed persons in Figure 5.1 includes persons employed with a wage subsidy, but excludes persons on 
leave (for instance on maternity leave) and persons receiving public sickness benefits.  
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20-24 years 25-29 years 30-34 years 35-39 years 40-44 years 45-49 years 50-54 years 55-59 years 60-64 years
Men Women
Source: Databank of Statistics Denmark 
 
5.2 UNEMPLOYMENT FLOWS AND RATES 
 
One of the characteristic features of the Danish labour market is the high volume of flows in and 
out of unemployment. Figure 5.2 shows the number of persons having been unemployed for a 
shorter or longer period of time in each of the years from 1995 to 2004. 
 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Less than 73 days 74 - 146 days 147 - 219 days 220 - 292 days 293 - 365 days
 
Source: Databank of Statistics Denmark 
 
In 1995 a total of nearly 800,000 persons or almost one third of the workforce was unemployed 
one or more times during the year. About 323,000 experienced unemployment less than 20 percent 
of the year, while 114,000 persons were unemployed for more than 80 percent of the year, and thus 
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considered long-term unemployed by the standard definition applied in Danish statistics.13 The graph 
illustrates the reduction in the number of persons experiencing unemployment during the upswing 
of the 1990s and the slight increase in 2003 and 2004. From 2005 the numbers are falling again. The 
number of long-term unemployed has been falling from more than 100,000 persons in the beginning 
of the period to less than 50,000 persons in the most recent years. These figures can be compared 
to a total workforce of 2,895,950 persons in 1995 and 2,854,100 in 2004.  
 
The dominance of short term unemployment on the Danish labour market is also illustrated in the 
survival curve (Figure 5.3), which shows the outflow from unemployment to employment (including 
state-supported education) or retirement for the 130,000 new unemployed entering unemployment 
in the period from the 3rd quarter of 2002 to the 2nd quarter of 2003. After 6 months about 68 
percent were in employment, while 80 percent were in employment after one year 
(Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2005a). The curve also shows the difference between the insured and the 
non-insured unemployed. The latter has a lower outflow from unemployment in the first weeks of 
unemployment, but after a year the share left in unemployment is about the same for the two 
groups.  
 
Figure 5.3: Survival curves for insured (Forsikrede) and non-insured (Ikke forsikrede) unemployed and average 
curve for both groups (Gns.), 2005.  
 
Source: Beskæftigelsesministeriet 2005a, Figure 2.  
 
                                                  
13 The most important statistical concept is Danish unemployment statistics is the “degree of unemployment”, measuring the 
percentage of a year in which a person has been registered as unemployed. A long-term unemployed is defined by this measure 
as a person having been unemployed for more than 80 percent of a given year. This definition differs from the concept applied 
in the labour force survey, where a person is considered unemployed if s/he has been unemployed for more than 12 months.  
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The unemployment rate by sex is shown in Figure 5.4, which documents the somewhat higher 
unemployment for women that for men. Thus in 2005 the average unemployment rate for men was 
5.0 percent and for women 6.5 percent.  
 








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Men  Women
 
Source: Databank of Statistics Denmark 
 
Similarly the unemployment rates for different age groups are documented in Figure 5.5. The 
relationship between the age groups is rather stable. In 2005, unemployment rates above 6 percent 
are found for the age groups 24-34 years and for those aged 55 years and more. A remarkable 
feature of the Danish labour market is the low youth unemployment rate, which is often attributed 
to the special youth measures introduced in 1996. The overall purpose of the youth programme was 
to stimulate unemployed, low-skilled youngsters to take up paid employment or to participate in 
education.  
 
Originally, the programme was only targeted at young people under the age of 25 who have not 
acquired professional or vocational qualifications and who are entitled to regular unemployment 
benefits. But as a result of the success of the scheme, the youth package was since January 1999 
extended to cover all persons under the age of 25 claiming regular unemployment benefits. The 
main aim of the programme is to motivate young unemployed to undertake ordinary education or 
to find an ordinary job on their own initiative. If they fail to do so within six months of 
unemployment, they have the right and duty to participate in full-time special vocational education 
or training (in ordinary education or in other activities, such as job training) for at least 18 months 
received a benefit, which is fifty percent of the normal. It is however disputed, whether the lowering 
of the rate of youth unemployment is also due to other factors including the general economic 
upswing since the early 1990s (see Bredgaard & Jørgensen, 2000).  
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
18-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years 30-34 years 35-39 years
40-44 years 45-49 years 50-54 years 55-59 years 60-64 years
 
Source: Databank of Statistics Denmark 
 
Another important factor related to the unemployment rate is the educational background, which is 
of course also to some degree correlated with age and sex. As shown in Figure 5.6 there is a stable 
hierarchy, where the highest unemployment rates are found for those groups without any vocations 
education and the lowest for those with a medium-cycle vocation background.  
 









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
No voc.edu. Basic voc. edu. Short-cycle voc.edu.
Medium cycle voc.edu. Long-cycle edu. 
 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Survey 2005, Statistics Denmark 
 
An important issue of the Danish labour market is the difficult employment situation of immigrants 
from non-Western countries, which is also illustrated by the unemployment rates in Figure 5.7. 
Especially first generation immigrants stand out as having very high unemployment rates.  
 
AIAS-UvA   57 Per Kongshøj Madsen 









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Immigrants, Western Descendents, Western Immigrants, Non-Western
Descendents, Non-Western Danish origin
Source: Databank of Statistics Denmark 
 
Several interrelated reasons can be pointed to in explaining the barriers that immigrants and 
descendants from non-western countries meet on the Danish labour market: 
•  Their lower average level of education; 
•  Language barriers;  
•  Discrimination; 
•  The narrow wage dispersion, which makes it difficult for persons with a very low productivity to 
enter into employment (e.g. unskilled immigrants with insufficient language skills); 
•  Unemployment traps due to relatively high social benefits (although special low level has been 
introduced for some immigrant groups); and 
•  The fact that many non-Western immigrants seek to Denmark for other reasons that to find a 
job (political asylum or family reunification).  
 
While the former three barriers will be valid for most European countries, the three latter are 
probably more dominant on the Danish labour market that in many other Central or Southern 
European countries.  
 
5.3 THE ECONOMICALLY INACTIVE 
 
Turning to the issue of the economically inactive, the number of registered unemployed presented 
above tells only part of the story about how many adults, which are economically inactive. As 
indicated by Figure 5.8, the number of unemployed in 2004 was surpassed by both the number of 
recipients and invalidity pension and the number of persons receiving Voluntary Early Retirement 
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Pay (Unemployment pension). This scheme under certain conditions allows persons aged 60-65 
years to retire and receive a pension equal to unemployment benefits. The total number of persons 
receiving some form of transfer income in 2004 was almost 900,000 persons (full time equivalents) 
or about 25 percent of the adult population aged 15-65 years. Given the fact that the average 
employment rate in the same year was almost 75 percent, the striking observation is that for adult 
Danes there are only two alternative positions vis-à-vis the labour market: either as employed or as 
recipient of public transfer income. 
 
Figure 5.8: Number of adults (aged 15-65 years) receiving some form of transfer income, full time equivalents, 
2004.  











Source: Databanks of Statistics Denmark 
 
As indicated by the time-series in Figure 5.9, the number of persons receiving some form of public 
transfer income has increased rather dramatically since the early 1960s. The number reached a peak 
in the mid-1990s and then declined a bit as a reflection of the improved situation on the labour 
market and, perhaps, also more efficient policies.  
 
Figure 5.9 might leave the impression of an employment system under considerable strain. However, 
the data in Figure 5.10 indicates that the picture is more mixed. When looking at the distribution of 
the adult population by activity-status from 1960 to 2002, the remarkable observation is that the 
share in employment has been rather stable at the level of about 75 percent – thus indicating that an 
employment rate of the magnitude is a stylised fact of the Danish employment system. Within the 
group of employed, one observes an increase in the share of public employees during the 1960s and 
1970s as a reflection of the development of the modern Danish welfare states. The most dramatic 
change, however, has taken place among the economically inactive. Here the group of adult persons 
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not receiving an income from employment or from the public sector (mostly women working at 
home) has almost vanished. Instead one sees the steep growth in the groups of persons receiving 
public transfer income.  
 








































































Total  Whereof unemployed
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance and Databanks of Statistics Denmark. 
 
The fascinating thing about Figure 5.10 is that it – in one glimpse – tells the main story about the 
interplay between the labour market and the welfare state in Denmark over the last four decades. 
Thus the abolishment of the housewife marked the end of the traditional male breadwinner family 
and the full integration of the women into the labour market, many as public employees with 
healthcare and social services. The figure also shows the strong processes of marginalisation on a 
labour market characterised by rapid technological change and high demands on productivity 
associated with high average wages and rather narrow wage dispersion. In a situation where 
economic safety nets are available, and for some groups even attractive compared to earned 
income, it is not surprising that the number of inactive recipients of transfer income grew at a quick 
pace – and often most rapidly in periods of economic decline. 
 
The previous analysis has focused on the developments of net stocks over time and thus provided 
limited information about the flows of persons between different situations in the labour market. 
Due to the availability of administrative registers, it is possible to trace the labour market 
attachment of individuals over time. The Economic Council published one such study in 2000 
looking at the shift between different positions vis-à-vis the labour market based on a core-
periphery-scale. 
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Private employment Public employment Transfer income Supported by the family
 Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance and Databanks of Statistics Denmark. 
 
Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of the adult population aged 15-65 years by their dominant labour 
































Source: Author’s calculations based on Det økonomiske Råd (2000), Table III.1 
 
As shown in Figure 5.11, about 39 percent of the adult persons have full time employment and 
rarely experience unemployment. They are therefore labelled the “core”.  Almost as many (32 
percent) have a more unstable employment career (“the middle group”), but are still predominantly 
employed. The group of “marginalised” persons (here defined as persons being unemployed for 
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more than 80 percent of the time incl. recipients of social benefits not registered as unemployed), 
the persons permanently on transfer income and persons outside the labour add up to a total of 29 
percent of the adults.  
 
However, the statuses in Figure 5.11 are not permanent, when you look at the individual labour 
market careers. The Table below indicates the dynamics involved.  
 
Table 5.2: Labour market status in 1995-1997 by status in 1992-1994. 
Status 












education  Dead  Total 
Core  75,1 2,4  13,1  0,3  1,3  4,4  1  1  1,2  99,8 
Part-time  21,5 35,6 27,1  0,6  2,3  7,1  2  2,3  1,3  99,8 
Middle 
group  32,9  4,1  38  4,5  5,1  5,6 1,6 6,5  1,7  100 
Marginal  2,8 0,4 38,4 20  9  20,4  1,7  5,9  1,9 100,5 
Social 
security  6,9 2  32,4 3,6  25,8  16,3  3,6  5,7  3,6 99,9 
Permanent 
transfer  0 0 0,1 0  0,3  93,2  0,3  0  6 99,9 
Outside 
workforce  16,1 4,6  15,6  0,6  3,4  12,2  35  3,6  8,7  99,8 
In 
education  8,2  1,8  45,4  1,5  3,2  3,4 1,5 35,4  2,8  103,2 
Source: Det økonomiske Råd, 2000, Table III.1  
 
Thus, while there is for some groups (especially the core-group and the group on permanent 
transfer income) a clear tendency to stay in the same group from the first to the second period, 
other position are much more transient in nature. Thus for the members of the marginal group or 
the group on social security, around one third moves into the middle group, and thus gains a more 
stable foothold on the labour market. Also the group working part-time is highly mobile, shifting to 
positions either in the core or in the middle group.  
 
A final comparative piece of evidence concerning the number of persons located “downstairs” in the 
Danish labour market model is shown in Figure 5.12, which shows the share of persons categorised 
as poor in 1996 and as persistent poor over a longer periods of time. Measured by both indicators, 
there is little evidence that the combination of low employment protection and income/employment 
security makes for high risks of becoming poor or permanently poor.  
 
62   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
Figure 5.12: Persistent risk-of-poverty rate for 1998-2001 (right) and at-risk-of-poverty rate (left) for 2001 in 
Denmark and a number of other EU Member States.  
 
Note: The risk of poverty rate measures the share of the population living in households with an “equivalised disposable 
income” below 60% of the median equivalised income of the country they live in. The persistent risk of poverty rates 
measures the share of the population that in in risk of poverty in at least two out of the three preceding years.  
Source: Eurostat (2004), Figure 5.  
 
Summing up the picture of the different groups in the Danish labour market, the main groups of 
winners appear to be large groups of salaried workers, skilled workers and also some unskilled 
groups.  On the other hand, the main groups of losers are indicated by the general growth in the 
number of adults receiving transfer incomes. This group may not all be in risk of absolute or relative 
poverty. But they will in many cases suffer from social exclusion due to the important role of 
working life as a road to social integration in Denmark. The groups mostly in risk of becoming 
marginalised are thus immigrants from non-Western countries, some unskilled groups, older 
workers and persons with health problems. However it is unclear, whether the Danish version of 
flexicurity in itself is the cause of these exclusionary elements in the Danish employment system. 
Thus one can argue that a lower level of employment protection has the role of creating winners 
also among the weaker groups on the labour market due to less statistical discrimination.  
 
Furthermore, within the framework of the Danish model, active labour market policy and policies to 
support adult education and training has the role of improving the employability for those groups 
that are in danger of becoming marginalised. One may see these institutional arrangements also as 
counterbalancing the risk of firms providing less continued education and training to their 
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5.4 EFFECTS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
As in many other countries, the net effects of active labour market policy are disputed. One reason 
is that active programmes have both positive and negative effects on the future employments 
prospects of the individual participants:  
•  The motivation effect implies that an unemployed person seeks work more actively in the period 
immediately before she or he has to participate in a mandatory activation programme. The 
strength of the motivation effect is indicated by the change in the probability of leaving unem-
ployment in the period immediately before the person is obliged to take part in an activation 
programme.  
•  The “locking-in”-effect means that job-search activities are reduced during the period that an 
individual takes part in a programme. 
•  The training (or qualification) effect stems from the rise in the level of qualifications during 
activation, which should improve the possibilities of finding a job for those who have 
participated in one of the active programmes.  
 
In a study published in 2000, the Ministry of Labour presented some of the first results based on a 
new database, which it had developed (Ministry of Labour, 2000). The database contains information 
on the labour market situation of all individuals, including their participation in labour market 
programmes and their contacts with the social security system. 
 
First of all, the study revealed significant motivation effects, measured by an increased probability to 
take up employment in the period immediately before having to take part in mandatory activation 
programmes. Such effects have been confirmed by later studies (e.g. Geerdsen, 2003; Rosholm & 
Svarer, 2004) and play an increasing role for the proponents of active programmes.  However, the 
specific dilemma posed by such observations should be borne in mind. If it is wished to increase the 
motivation effect, there may be a temptation to change the content of activation programmes in 
order to make them less attractive to participants. But this would also probably imply that the 
quality of the programmes themselves would be lowered in terms of their training content and other 
activities to improve the skills of the participants. As a result, the overall outcome might be less 
positive for those unemployed persons who are unable to find a job before entering activation.  
 
Another potential effect for the individuals taking part in activation programmes is that they increase 
their chance of gaining employment due to the improvement in their qualifications and therefore 
their employability. In the study by the Ministry of Labour, the improvement in employability is 
measured by the reduction in the proportion of the year for which the persons concerned receive 
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any form of transfer income (such as unemployment benefit, social assistance or sickness benefit). A 
reduction in this proportion is a reliable indicator of a genuine improvement in the employment 
situation of an individual, either because they have found ordinary employment or taken up some 
form of ordinary education.   
 
5.4.1 ESTIMATION OF THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS 
 
Such qualification effects of the various types of labour market programmes are of considerable 
interest. In this respect, the largest improvement in the employment situation (measured by an 
increase in the economic self-dependency of the participant) was in the study from 2000 found for 
participants in private job training. For public job training and labour market education the effects 
are positive, but smaller. These findings are in line with international experience (Martin, 2000).  
 
In the most recent study from the Ministry of Employment (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2005), the 
following conclusions are made concerning the qualifications effects:  
•  Positive effects from participation in active programmes are found for both insured and non-
insured unemployed and the estimated magnitude of the effects are rather similar; 
•  Job training with a wage subsidy gives the largest effects, especially job training in the private 
sector; 
•  Positive effects are also found for educational programmes, especially when targeted towards 
job-types with labour shortages; 
•  Especially for non-insured unemployed one observes a larger effects of education, when 
measuring the effect one year after participation compared to measuring the effects after six 
months, thus pointing to the importance of longer term effects; and 
•  Finally it is observed that combinations of different programmes (for instance education 
combined with job-training) gives larger effects that just participating in single programmes, 
although this must also be seen in the light of the longer duration of such combined 
programmes.  
 
Some studies have been sceptical towards the positive net effects of active programmes, often 
pointing to the existence of significant locking-in effects. By example, the Chairmen of the Economic 
Council in their report from December 2002 ascribe about one third of the reduction in 
unemployment since 1993 to improved structural performance of the Danish labour market and 
attributes part hereof to improved labour market policy (Det økonomiske Råds formandskab, 2002).  
However, the report gives a rather critical account of the majority of the instruments applied within 
active labour market policy and especially points to significant locking-in effects of several measures. 
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Only job training in private firms seems to have large positive net effects and to be cost-effective. 
Job-training in the public sector and many forms of education have dubious or negative net 
outcomes for the participants. On this background the Chairmen proposes improvements in the use 
of active measures (including giving higher priority to job search and private job-training). 
 
5.4.2 CREAMING AND PARKING 
 
One barrier to getting reliable quantitative assessments of the effects of different programmes is of 
course the heterogeneity of the participants. While easily observable differences between 
participants with respect to for instance age and education can be compensated for by well-known 
statistical techniques, it is more difficult to take account for unobserved differences like work 
motivation and self confidence. These problems will of course be reinforced, if those actors 
responsible for the programmes are able to discriminate between different participants based of 
their assessment of the degree to which they will benefit from the offers of the programme. Such 
effects are often referred to as creaming (preferential treatment of “strong” unemployed) and 
parking (giving the less resourceful unemployed only the minimum remedies). 
 
The existence of such effects has over the years been documented in several Danish studies of 
active programmes. Given the increased emphasis in recent years on private service providers and 
economic incentives in the implementation of the programmes, there is of course a higher risk of 
such effects, which have been observed in other countries introducing similar systems (cf. Bredgaard 
et al., 2005).  The results from a new Danish study indicate that this is actually the case although the 
use of private service providers in the Danish has some special traits including (Bredgaard & Larsen, 
2006): 
•  Not applying a full-scale outsourcing but the parallel use of public, private and semi-private 
providers (including also some trade unions and unemployment insurance funds); 
•  A decentralised scheme for tendering; 
•  A process characterised by dialogue and cooperation between the PES and the service 
providers; and 
•  A inclusion of the social partners in the process of outsourcing (in some cases having the trade 
unions as providers). 
  
5.4.3 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
 
Concerning international comparisons, it is difficult to assess the efficiency of Danish active labour 
market policy in a comparative perspective. Figure 5.13 gives some data on overall unemployment, 
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long-term unemployment and youth unemployment for a number of European countries. As 
indicated by Figure 5.13, Denmark is among the best performers among the European countries, 
when assessed by various aspects of unemployment. Also when measured by other indicators of 
labour market performance like life-long learning, gender pay gaps, employment rates of older 
workers etc. Denmark is among the top performers of the EU Member States.  
 
Figure 5.13: Total unemployment (unemployed as % of workforce), long-term unemployment (long-term 
unemployed as % of workforce) and youth unemployment (unemployed as % of age group) in a number of EU 















































































































Total unemployment Long-term unemployment Youth unemployment
 
Source: European Commission 2003, statistical annex. The countries are ranked according to the sum of the three indicators.  
 
5.4.4 MACRO-EFFECTS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
The evaluation findings discussed above have focussed on the micro-level. However, the coincidence 
of the implementation of the labour market reforms from 1993 and onwards and the dramatic fall in 
Danish unemployment during the 1990s has of course stimulated discussions about the extent to 
which the inflation-free macro-economic upturn can be attributed to the shift in labour market 
policy in the 1990s. A lowering of the level of wage inflation for a given size of unemployment is 
taken as an indicator of greater flexibility in the functioning of the labour market.  
 
Of course, there could be a number of factors behind these developments. The changing attitudes of 
the social partners could be important. Thus, in 1987 the social partners issued a joint declaration 
stating that they would take the overall macro-economic performance into consideration and 
therefore negotiate wage increases below the international wage inflation in order to improve the 
competitiveness of the Danish industry. This declaration has since laid the foundation for the general 
wage negotiations. From a theoretical perspective this explanation can be supported by the concept 
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of the “negotiated economy”, which sees Denmark as a prime example of a society, where a joint 
conception of the overall targets and constraints for macro-economic development has been 
established (Nielsen & Pedersen, 1991).   
 
Furthermore, Danish wage negotiations have to an increasing degree been decentralised to the level 
of the individual firms. Thus, in the collective agreements covering the major part of the private 
sector, only 15 percent of the agreements had centrally negotiated wage rates in 2000. In 1989, the 
share was 34 percent. The share of agreements, which mentions no wage rate at all increased during 
the same period from 4 to 20 percent (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 2003: Table 8.10). According to 
the well know Calmfors-Driffill-hypothesis, this development could also explain slower wage 
growth. 
  
Combining the conditions for wage negotiations at the central and de-central level, one could 
therefore point to a shift in the norms for wage negotiations, which implies both a recommendation 
of wage restraint from actors at the central level and a higher acceptance of the need to keep wages 
in line with (foreign) competitors at the firm level. Thus shifts in norms and in the organisation of 
wage formation overruled the potential inflationary effects of a large reduction in unemployment. 
This points to the complexity of the forces that determine inflation and to the fragility of the 
traditional Phillips-curve. 
 
In this context one must furthermore emphasize the lowering of the international level of inflation 
(including wage inflation) as an important factor behind the lower internal pressure for nominal 
wage increases. In their report from December 2002, the Chairmen of the Economic Council 
presented a new model of Danish wage formation, which includes wage increases abroad as an 
important explanatory variable. The estimate for the influence of foreign wage growth implies that 
Danish nominal wages increase by almost 0.6 percent, when foreign wages increase by 1 percent 
(Det Økonomiske Råds Formandsskab, 2002: pp. 155-6). 
 
A final point worth taking into the argument concerning the lowering of nominal wage inflation is 
the difference between the development of nominal and real wages during the last decades, cf. 
Figure 5.14. The main message is that stable growth in real wages of about 2 percent per year can be 
reached also at a moderate level of nominal wage growth, as indicated by the experience from the 
1990s. The opposite lesson was learned during the years from 1977 to 1986, where increases in 
nominal wages of 5 to 12 percent resulted in increases in real wages around zero. An added factor 
during the period from 1994 and onwards was the further increase in private consumption made 
possible by the growth in prices of private homes and the easy access to cheap mortgage. Therefore 
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the perception of the need to moderate nominal wage growth was strongly supported by the daily 
experience of the wage earners themselves – slow wage increases and rising living standards could 
easily go hand in hand.   
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Source: Databanks of the macro-econometric model ADAM (Statistics Denmark) 
 
While one can therefore present a number of explanations for the shift in the unemployment-
inflation nexus on the Danish labour market since the early 1990s, one can also point to evidence, 
which support the view that the reforms of labour market policy during the 1990s made a significant 
contribution to the improved functioning of the labour market. Thus the Chairmen of the Economic 
Council, who as indicated above are rather sceptical to the merits of active labour market 
programmes, nevertheless ascribe a little less than half of the reduction in unemployment since 1993 
to improved structural performance of the Danish labour market and attributes a significant part 
hereof to the reforms of labour market policy, although they find it difficult to provide a more exact 
estimate. The Chairmen furthermore point to an increase in the share of unemployed that are 
actively looking for work and relate this to the shortenings of the period of passive benefits 
payments and the stricter demands to take part in activation (Det Økonomiske Råds Formandskab, 
2002: pp. 163-5 and 153).   
 
A study from the Danish National Institute of Social Research in 1998 summed up the evidence 
from a large-scale evaluation programme studying the initial labour market reform of 1994 (Larsen 
and Langager, 1998: pp. 34-36). Concerning the importance of the activation strategy, the analysis 
showed that: 
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•  The employment goals specified in the individual action plans indicated that there was a 
considerable planned mobility among the unemployed; 
•  Labour market policy seemed to function effectively in that planned mobility among the 
unemployed was larger in those regions where the need for mobility was the highest (due to 
threats of bottlenecks); 
•  There were significant positive employment effects of both job training and education for 
unemployed; and 
•  The effective supply of labour among the insured unemployed seemed to have increased from 1994 to 
1997 probably due to the stricter demands made on the unemployed during the second phase of 
the reform (for instance in relation to the increased demands on the young unemployed).  
 
Concerning the activities directed at the firms, there were indications that the reform has 
contributed to the absence of bottlenecks since 1994: 
•  There was a (weak) indication that the quality of the services of the Public Employment Service to the 
firms has improved since the reform when looking at the ability to fulfil the needs for qualified 
labour (though there were also examples of labour shortages in the short run); 
•  The introduction of new forms of placement services (in the form of "open" self-service 
placements) had - together with the surveillance activities and regular contacts with employers - 
lead to an increase in the transparency of the labour market and thus improved its function as a 
system to match demand for and supply of labour; the market share of the Public Employment 
Service however, was still rather low. 
 
Thus, based on the positive evaluation findings for both the process and the effect of the labour 
market reforms, there is a well-based case for arguing that the change in Danish labour market 
policy in 1993-94 has made a separate contribution to the improved functionality of the Danish 
labour market in recent years. The absence of labour shortages and wage-pressure since 1994, in 
spite of the fall in unemployment and the strong growth in employment, indicate that the functioning 
of the labour market has improved.  
 
Also, as indicated in Figure 5.9 above, the number of both unemployed and the total number of adult 
persons receiving transfer income has been falling since 1993. The number of recipients of transfer 
income has been steadily rising since the early 1960s, but started falling in 1993. To what extent this 
is due to the labour market reforms, the economic upswing or to other of the above mentioned 
factors cannot be definitively determined on the basis of the available evidence. 
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5.5 INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED 
 
The (lack of) economic incentives to return to employment due to the rather high levels of benefits, 
especially for those at the lower income levels, is a standing debate among both researchers and 
policy makers. A huge literature can be found concerning the assessment of the various incentives 
and disincentives. Only a few recent studies are mentioned below.  
 
First of all one should notice that from the perspective of the flexicurity approach in the Danish 
case, the potential disincentives deriving from high income replacement rates of the UI-system are 
addressed by requiring the unemployed to be actively seeking jobs and by offering mandatory full-
time activation after 12 months of unemployment for adults and six months of unemployment for 
young unemployed persons under the age of 25. Activation is therefore seen as fulfilling both a 
qualification and a motivational purpose. 
 
Secondly, the standard view of labour economists is to express some worries about the 
disincentives of unemployment benefits. A characteristic example is the study by Pedersen and Smith 
(2002). Their results indicate large disincentive effects for some groups, especially low paid women. 
In 1996, 6 per cent of Danish men and 13 per cent of the women had a lower disposable net income 
if working in a full-time job compared to being on unemployment benefits. They find that the net 
compensation rate in unemployment has a significant impact on women's propensity to leave the 
labour force, on measures of search intensity, on the risk of being affected by unemployment, and on 
one of their flexibility measures, i.e. the maximum acceptable commuting time to a job. The net 
compensation rate has no impact on the willingness to move to another place to get a job. Also, the 
authors find a number of significant effects from attitude variables. However, the main conclusion is 
that economic incentives dominate the present analysis of unemployment traps. 
 
Along similar lines, the Ministry of Finance in 2004 published a report on the role of taxation and 
other economic incentives (Finansministeriet, 2004). Among their main conclusions with respect to 
unemployment traps were that: 
 
In general there are considerable economic incentives to become employed instead unemployed; 
thus the average net rate of compensation in 2004 was 63 percent (measured on the basis of 
disposable income). This represents a decline from 65 percent in 2001. The share of the employed 
persons for which the increase in disposable income is less than 1000 DKK per month was 5.4 
percent in 2004, down from 7.8 percent in 2001.  
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While both these sources point to risks of unemployment traps at least for the lower income 
groups, other research has argued that such risks are negligible, mainly due to the fact that non-
economic incentives combined with the availability of jobs play the dominant role, when explaining, 
whether unemployed return to work or not (Goul Andersen et al., 2003).  
 
5.6 WAGES AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 
 
Over the last decade, wage setting in Denmark has become still more decentralised. Thus in 2004, 
only 16 percent of the collective agreements (measured by share of workers covered) under the 
DA/LO-area specified a standard wage rate (so-called “normal wage”). In 62 percent of the 
agreements, a minimum wage was specified, but actual wages were to be set by local negotiations. 
Finally in 22 percent of the agreements, no wage rate was mentioned at all. The latter represents an 
increase in such “wage-less” agreements from 4 percent in 1999.  There is no statutory minimum 
wage in Denmark.  
 
There are no formal links between wage setting and social insurance. Concerning informal 
interrelations, they are probably weak if existing at all. The reason is of cause that neither the trade 
unions nor the unemployment insurance funds will experience any immediate costs, if excessive 
wage claims should cause increases in unemployment. This is of cause due to the fact that the state 
pays for any increases in expenditures on unemployment benefits. One could add that economic 
experts from time to time have argued the case for making trade unions more responsible for the 
(assumed) consequences of wage increases by creating some connection between the memberships 
financing of unemployment benefits and the actual unemployment level, but without success.  
 
Concerning wage levels and wage dispersion, Figure 5.15 gives a few basic facts. The largest 
dispersion is found for gross wages, where the relation between the highest and the lowest level is 
2.7.  For disposable income the relation is 2.2. Apart from this rather narrow wage dispersion, the 
Danish labour market shares a number of characteristics with other Northern European labour 
market. Thus there is an unmistakable wage gap between men and women, which can be estimated 
at between 12 to 19 percent (Deding & Wong, 2004). In the private sector about 10 percentage 
points cannot be explained by background factors like age and education. In the public sector, the 
unexplained part of the gender wage gap is almost nil.  
 
Also when it comes to a number of other aspects like choice of education and career patters, there 
are still significant gender differences on the Danish labour market (cf. Holt et al, 2006).  
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Wage including pensions Wage excluding pensions Disposable income
Highest qual.level Skilled work Sales and service Low skilled
 
Source: Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (2004), Table 6.28 
 
5.7 LEGITIMACY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM  
 
As described in section 3, the Danish system of unemployment insurance is based on voluntary 
membership of private, but state supported funds covering about 80 percent of the wage earners. 
Since 2001, the Directorate of Labour has conducted yearly surveys to measure the level of 
satisfaction with the funds among their members. Some of the main results from the latest survey 
are (Larsen & Ståhle, 2005):  
•  The members have a positive assessment of the service that they get from their insurance funds; 
more than 80 percent find that the service is satisfactory or very satisfactory; 
•  In spite hereof more than a quarter (28 percent) express a low assessment of the usefulness of 
their membership, even when limiting the sample to those which have experienced 
unemployment and therefore received unemployment benefits; and  
•  The members express a high level of solidarity with the fund of which they are members; thus 
80 percent see no reasons to consider a shift to another insurance fund.  
 
The low assessment of the usefulness of membership may be related to the compensation rate, 
which is considerably lower for medium and high-income earners. At least the study shows that the 
member’s evaluation of the unemployment insurance funds is lower, the higher the level of 
education.  
 
As a supplement to the – generally positive - assessments of the UI-system by the members of the 
fund described above, one can provide some documentation concerning the general attitudes of the 
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population towards the level of unemployment benefits and the obligations of the state in this 
respect. Here one of the repeated observations from studies of the Danish welfare state is the high 
level of legitimacy of its different elements including the unemployment benefit system (Green-
Pedersen et al., 2006: p. 27).  
 
Table 5.3 is taken from a recent study of voters’ attitudes towards different elements of public 
spending and indicates that the voters in general find the level of unemployment benefits to be 
appropriate in 2001, but also that the balance of opinion has shifted somewhat since the mid-1980s, 
where voters were in favour of higher benefits. One also notes that the general attitude to the level 
of social assistance is somewhat less positive.  
 
Table 5.3: Attitudes towards welfare spending, 1979-2005.Percentages and balance of opinion (percentage points).  
  2001:  the state spends  Balance of opinion: too little minus too much 
  Too 
little 
Appropriate  Too 
much 
1985  1990  1994  1998  2001  2003  2005 
Health  care  70  27  3  +61  +61 +73 +77 +67 +49 +55 
Old  age  pension  47  52  1  +64  +57 +51 +42 +46 +38 +41 
Education  48  50  2  +44  +45 +42 +39 +46 +46 +65 
Unemployment 
benefits (level) 
12  75  13  +17  +2  0  -7 -1    
Social assistance 
(level) 
11  65  24  +30 -11 -11 -19 -13    
Aid to developing 
countries 
10  48  42    -26 -35 -10 -32 -12 +5 
Immigrants/ 
refugees 
12  43  45    -30 -35 -41 -33 -13 -1 
Wording: “Now, I’ll ask about your view on public expenditures for various purposes. I should like to know whether you 
think, government spends (1) too much,  (2) appropriate, or (3) too little money on these tasks”. 
Source: Goul Andersen, 2006, Table 4 
 
The same study also gives information about the voter’s attitude towards the scope of government 
with respect to providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed in comparison with some 
other obligations, summarised in Table 5.4.  
 
When the voters are asked to give priority to unemployment benefits compared to other forms of 
expenditure, they tend to place them in the second rank, below health care, old age pensions and 




74   AIAS-UvA Distribution of responsibility for social security: Denmark 
Table 5.4: Attitudes towards the scope of government, 2000.  
To what extent should it be the 
responsibility of the government to … 









Provide health care for the sick  83  14  2  1  0  1.19 
Provide a decent standard of living for the 
old 
71 26  3 0  0 1.33 
Provide child care for everybody who needs 
it 
53 35  8 4  0 1.62 
Provide a decent standard of living for the 
unemployed 
33  48 16 2  1  1.88 
Provide decent housing for those who 
cannot afford it 
39  45 12 3  1  1.78 
Integrate  immigrants  38  40 13 7  2  1.90 
Provide good leisure facilities for children 
and young people 
32  46 18 3  1  1.93 
Provide leave arrangements for families with 
small children 
30  46 15 8  1  2.00 
Provide leisure facilities for pensioners  28  46 19 6  1  2.03 
Provide a job for everyone who wants one  19  44  25  10  2  2.26 
Reduce income differences between the 
rich and the poor 
19  27 27 25  2  2.60 
Source: Goul Andersen, 2006, Table 5. 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Given its long history and development through an ongoing process of political compromises with 
strong elements of path dependency, it is not surprising that the Danish system of social insurance 
and labour market policy has developed into a rather complex structure. However, its main traits 
can be summed up as follows. 
 
Firstly the system still reflects a basic division between those workers that are members of the 
unemployment insurance funds and those that are not. The first group is under the auspices of a 
basically state-run system, while the latter are taken care of by the municipalities. With the latest 
reform to be implemented from 2007 and onwards, the borders between the two systems are 
weakening (especially with respect to active labour market programmes), but will remain especially, 
when it comes to the benefit side.  
 
For the insured unemployed the demand for insurances is basically individual in the sense that the 
choice to become a member of a fund is a choice made by each worker. Given the strong links 
between the unemployment insurance funds and the trade unions, there is however a strong 
element of collectiveness in the system due to the fact that the membership of the fund and the 
union is conceived as a package, although formally being independent of each other. For this reason, 
the position of the unemployment insurance funds close to the unions is often taken as an 
explanation of the high degree of unionisation on the Danish labour market. 
 
Also, the financing of the unemployment benefits for the insured unemployed is based mainly on the 
state (through general taxation), thus giving the benefits the character of a public transfer income, 
although distributed through private organisations (the unemployment insurance funds). Given that 
membership contributions are unrelated to risks of becoming unemployed, there are no actuarial 
elements in the system.  
 
The only example of private demand for and supply of unemployment benefits is the (limited) 
market for supplementary unemployment insurance that has developed in recent years. 
 
For the non-insured unemployed, which either do not fulfil the membership criteria for the 
unemployment insurance funds or have chosen not to become members, the (means-tested) 
benefits are financed through general taxation (central and local) and administered by the 
municipalities.  
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The provision of employment services is a public task, although private service providers can enter 
as sub-contractors for the public agencies (central or local). The state-run public employment 
service is mainly responsible for the insured unemployed, while the non-insured unemployed are 
handled by the municipalities. From 2007, a more integrated system will be implemented with the 
creation of joint job centres combining the Public Employment Service and the social assistance 
sections of the municipalities. However, as mentioned, the benefit-side will still be based on a two-
tier system.  
 
Furthermore, one can emphasise that recent studies and policy discourses has put increasing 
emphasis on the interplay between the different elements of the system of social security and labour 
market policy, pointing to the manner in which it is characterised by virtues circles between an 
extending safety net provided by social security and active labour market policies on the one hand, 
and a low level of individual employment protection on the other.  
 
Finally one may consider the issue of winners and looser in the much appraised Danish model of 
flexicurity (Madsen, 2007). Here, the main groups of winners appear to be large groups of salaried 
workers, skilled workers and also some unskilled groups. In general, the model provides easier 
access to a standard employment contract and thus a minor role for temporary workers and 
agencies.  
 
On the other hand, the main groups of losers on the Danish labour market are indicated by the 
general growth in the number of adults receiving transfer incomes. This group may not all be in risk 
of absolute or relative poverty. But they will in many cases suffer from social exclusion due to the 
important role of working life as a road to social integration in Denmark.  
 
The groups mostly in risk of becoming marginalised are thus immigrants from non-Western 
countries, some unskilled groups, older workers and persons with health problems. However it is 
unclear, whether the Danish version of flexicurity in itself is the cause of these exclusionary 
elements in the Danish employment system. Thus one can argue that a lower level of employment 
protection has the role of creating winners also among the weaker groups on the labour market due 
to lower barriers to enter employment. With easier access to dismissing their employees, the 
employers will also be less reluctant to hire workers, who have had some troubles in their labour 
market career like long-term unemployment, health problems etc.  
 
Furthermore, within the framework of the Danish model, active labour market policy and policies to 
support adult education and training has the role of improving the employability for those groups 
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that are in danger of becoming marginalised. One may see these institutional arrangements also as 
counterbalancing the risk of firms providing less continued education and training to their 
employees, due to the risk of loosing their human capital investments with employees leaving their 
jobs.  
 
Looking finally and briefly on the employer’s side of the labour market, the main winners in the 
Danish model will be those firms that experience frequent fluctuations in demand (e.g. within the 
tourism industry) and the smaller firms, for whom less numerical flexibility could imply higher costs 
due to the facts that their possibility to apply other forms of flexibility will probably be less that for 
lager companies.  
 
Taking a longer-term perspective, a number of problems may be identified which could increase the 
forces that are already causing a rise in the number of persons excluded from the Danish labour 
market. These include: 
•  The demographic changes over the coming decades, which imply a growth in the number of 
older workers, with higher risks of becoming marginalised; 
•  The rising share of immigrants in the Danish population, with the proportion of persons from 
non-European countries rising from about 4 per cent today to about10 per cent in 2020; and 
•  The increasing wage competition from low-wage countries, also within Europe, which have been 
amplified due to the entry of a number of Eastern European countries into the European Union.  
 
These challenges to the Danish model will place the need to reduce the upward trend in the 
numbers of persons left outside the flexicurity triangle high on the Danish political agenda in coming 
years. 
 
To these challenges one can add the uncertain impacts of the present reforms of the model 
involving a new structure of governance with respect to labour market policy. Thus, while the major 
political parties and social partners still support the basic features of the model, a stronger liberal 
political ideology could gain momentum, which in the longer run might hamper the social balance 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ADIR  National Directorate of Labour 
 
AMI  National Institute of Occupational Health 
 
AMS  National Labour Market Authority 
 
APW  Average Production Worker 
 
ASK  National Board of Industrial injuries 
 
AT  Working Environment Service 
 
DKK Danish  Krone 
 
DØR  Board of Economic Advisers 
 
EEA  European Economic Area 
 
LO  Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
 
NAP  National Action Plan for Employment 
 
PES  Public Employment Service 
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relations and employment flexibility in Poland” 
 October  2005 
  Marta Kahancova & Marc van der Meer 
05-38  “Income distribution in the Netherlands in the 20th century: long-run developments and cyclical 
properties” 
 September  2005 
 Emiel  Afman 
05-37  “Search, Mismatch and Unemployment” 
July 2005 
  Maite Blazques & Marcel Jansen 
05-36  “Women’s Preferences or Delineated Policies? The development of part-time work in the 
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom” 
 July  2005 
  Mara Yerkes & Jelle Visser 
05-35   “Vissen in een vreemde vijver: Het werven van verpleegkundigen en verzorgenden in het buitenland”  
May 2005  
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Judith Roosblad  
05-34   “Female part-time employment in the Netherlands and Spain: an analysis of the reasons for taking a 
part-time job and of the major sectors in which these jobs are performed”  
  May 2005  
  Elena Sirvent Garcia del Valle  
05-33   “Een Functie met Inhoud 2004 - Een enquête naar de taakinhoud van secretaressen 2004, 2000, 
1994”  
  April 2005  
  Kea Tijdens  
04-32   “Tax evasive behavior and gender in a transition country”  
  November 2004  
  Klarita Gërxhani  
04-31   “How many hours do you usually work? An analysis of the working hours questions in 17 large-scale 
surveys in 7 countries”  
  November 2004  
  Kea Tijdens  
04-30   “Why do people work overtime hours? Paid and unpaid overtime working in the Netherlands”  
  August 2004  
  Kea Tijdens  
04-29   “Overcoming Marginalisation? Gender and Ethnic Segregation in the Dutch Construction, Health, IT 
and Printing Industries”  
  July 2004  
  Marc van der Meer  
04-28   “The Work-Family Balance in Collective agreements. More Female employees, More Provisions?”  
  July 2004  
  Killian Schreuder  
04-27   “Female Income, the Ego Effect and the Divorce Decision: Evidence from Micro Data”  
  March 2004  
  Randy Kesselring (Professor of Economics at Arkansas State University , USA) was quest at AIAS in 
April and May 2003  
04-26   “Economische effecten van Immigratie – Ontwikkeling van een Databestand en eerste analyses  
  Januari 2004  
  Joop Hartog (FEE) & Aslan Zorlu  
03-25   ”Wage Indicator” – Dataset Loonwijzer 
  Januari 2004 dr Kea Tijdens 
03-24  “Codeboek DUCADAM Dataset” 
  December 2003 Drs Kilian Schreuder & dr Kea Tijdens 
03-23  “Household Consumption and Savings Around the Time of Births and the Role of Education” 
  December 2003 Adriaan S. Kalwij 
03-22  “A panel data analysis of the effects of wages, standard hours and unionisation on paid overtime work 
in Britain” 
  October 2003 Adriaan S. Kalwij 
03-21  “A Two-Step First-Difference Estimator for a Panel Data Tobit Model” 
  December 2003 Adriaan S. Kalwij 
03-20  “Individuals’ Unemployment Durations over the Business Cycle” 
  June 2003 dr Adriaan Kalwei 
03-19  Een onderzoek naar CAO-afspraken op basis van de FNV cao-databank en de AWVN-database” 
December 2003 dr Kea Tijdens & Maarten van Klaveren 
03-18  “Permanent and Transitory Wage Inequality of British Men, 1975-2001: Year, Age and Cohort 
Effects” 
  October 2003 dr Adriaan S. Kalwij & Rob Alessie 
03-17  “Working Women’s Choices for Domestic Help” 
  October 2003 dr Kea Tijdens, Tanja van der Lippe & Esther de Ruijter 
03-16  “De invloed van de Wet arbeid en zorg op verlofregelingen in CAO’s” 
  October 2003 Marieke van Essen 
03-15  “Flexibility and Social Protection” 
  August 2003 dr Ton Wilthagen 
03-14  “Top Incomes in the Netherlands and The United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century”September 
2003 Sir dr A.B.Atkinson and dr. W. Salverda 
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03-13  “Tax Evasion in Albania: an Institutional Vacuum”  
April 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani 
03-12  “Politico-Economic Institutions and the Informal Sector in Albania” 
May 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani 
03-11  “Tax Evasion and the Source of Income: An experimental study in Albania and the Netherlands”  
May 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani   
03-10  "Chances and limitations of "benchmarking" in the reform of welfare state structures - the case of 
pension policy”  
May 2003 dr Martin Schludi 
03-09  "Dealing with the "flexibility-security-nexus: Institutions, strategies, opportunities and barriers”  
May 2003 prof. Ton Wilthagen en dr. Frank Tros 
03-08  “Tax Evasion in Transition: Outcome of an Institutional Clash -Testing Feige’s Conjecture"  
March 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani 
03-07  “Teleworking Policies of Organisations- The Dutch Experiencee” 
February 2003 dr Kea Tijdens en Maarten van Klaveren 
03-06  “Flexible Work- Arrangements and the Quality of Life” 
February 2003 drs Cees Nierop 
01-05  Employer’s and employees’ preferences for working time reduction and working time differentiation 
– A study of the 36 hours working week in the Dutch banking industry” 
2001 dr Kea Tijdens 
01-04  “Pattern Persistence in Europan Trade Union Density”   
October 2001 prof. dr Danielle Checchi, prof. dr Jelle Visser 
01-03  “Negotiated flexibility in working time and labour market transitions – The case of the Netherlands”  
2001 prof. dr Jelle Visser 
01-02  “Substitution or Segregation: Explaining the Gender Composition in Dutch Manufacturing Industry 
1899 – 1998”    
June 2001 Maarten van Klaveren – STZ Advies en Onderzoek , Eindhoven, dr Kea Tijdens 
00-01  “The first part-time economy in the world. Does it work?”   
June 2000 prof. dr Jelle Visser 
 
 
RESEARCH REPORTS  
02-17  “Industrial Relations in the Transport Sector in the Netherlands” 
  December 2002 dr Marc van der Meer & drs Hester Benedictus 
03-16  "Public Sector Industrial Relations in the Netherlands: framework, principles, players and 
Representativity”  
January 2003 drs Chris Moll, dr Marc van der Meer & prof.dr Jelle Visser 
02-15  “Employees' Preferences for more or fewer Working Hours: The Effects of Usual, Contractual and 
Standard Working Time, Family Phase and Household Characteristics and Job Satisfaction”    
December 2002 dr Kea Tijdens 
02-13  “Ethnic and Gender Wage Differentials – An exploration of LOONWIJZERS 2001/2002” 
  October 2002 dr Aslan Zorlu 
02-12 “Emancipatie-effectrapportage  belastingen en premies – een verkenning naar nieuwe mogelijkheden 
vanuit het belastingstelsel 2001”    
August 2002 dr Kea Tijdens, dr Hettie A. Pott-Buter 
02-11  “Competenties van Werknemers in de Informatiemaatschappij – Een survey over   ICT-gebruik”  
June 2002 dr Kea Tijdens & Bram Steijn 
02-10  “Loonwijzers 2001/2002. Werk, lonen en beroepen van mannen en vrouwen in Nederland” 
 June  2002 Kea Tijdens, Anna Dragstra, Dirk Dragstra, Maarten van Klaveren, Paulien Osse, 
  Cecile Wetzels, Aslan Zorlu 
01-09  “Beloningsvergelijking tussen markt en publieke sector: methodische kantekeningen”   
  November 2001 Wiemer Salverda, Cees Nierop en Peter Mühlau 
01-08  “Werken in de Digitale Delta. Een vragenbank voor ICT-gebruik in organisaties”   
  June 2001 dr Kea Tijdens 
01-07  “De vrouwenloonwijzer. Werk, lonen en beroepen van vrouwen.”    
  June 2001 dr Kea Tijdens 
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00-06  “Wie kan en wie wil telewerken?” Een onderzoek naar de factoren die de mogelijkheid tot en de 
behoefte aan telewerken van werknemers beïnvloeden.” 
November 2000 dr Kea Tijdens, dr Cecile Wetzels en Maarten van Klaveren 
00-05  “Flexibele regels: Een onderzoek naar de relatie tussen CAO-afspraken en het bedrijfsbeleid over 
flexibilisering van de arbeid.”    
Juni 2000 dr Kea Tijdens & dr Marc van der Meer 
00-04  “Vraag en aanbod van huishoudelijke diensten in Nederland”   
 June  2000 dr Kea Tijdens 
00-03  “Keuzemogelijkheden in CAO’s”   
 June  2000 Caroline van den Brekel en Kea Tijdens 
00-02  “The toelating van vluchtelingen in Nederland en hun integratie op de arbeidsmarkt.” 
  Juni 2000 Marloes Mattheijer 
00-01  “The trade-off between competitiveness and employment in collective bargaining: the national 
consultation process and four cases of enterprise bargaining in the Netherlands”  
Juni 2000 Marc van der Meer (ed), Adriaan van Liempt, Kea Tijdens, Martijn van Velzen, Jelle Visser. 
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AIAS 
 
AIAS is a young interdisciplinary institute, established in 1998, aiming to become the leading expert centre in 
the Netherlands for research on industrial relations, organisation of work, wage formation and labour market 
inequalities.  
  
As a network organisation, AIAS brings together high-level expertise at the University of Amsterdam from five 
disciplines: 
•  Law 
•  Economics 
•  Sociology 
•  Psychology 
•  Health and safety studies 
 
AIAS provides both teaching and research. On the teaching side it offers a Masters in Advanced Labour 
Studies/Human Resources and special courses in co-operation with other organizations such as the National 
Trade Union Museum and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. The teaching is in 
Dutch but AIAS is currently developing a MPhil in Organisation and Management Studies and a European 
Scientific Master programme in Labour Studies in co-operation with sister institutes from other countries.  
  
AIAS has an extensive research program (2000-2004) building on the research performed by its member 
scholars. Current research themes effectively include: 
•  The impact of the Euro on wage formation, social policy and industrial relations 
•  Transitional labour markets and the flexibility and security trade-off in social and labour market 
regulation 
•  The prospects and policies of 'overcoming marginalisation' in employment 
•  The cycles of policy learning and mimicking in labour market reforms in Europe 
•  Female agency and collective bargaining outcomes 
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